paperclip/server/src/routes/activity.ts

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import { Router } from "express";
import { z } from "zod";
import type { Db } from "@paperclipai/db";
import { validate } from "../middleware/validate.js";
import { activityService } from "../services/activity.js";
[codex] harden authenticated routes and issue editor reliability (#3741) ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents for zero-human companies > - The control plane depends on authenticated routes enforcing company boundaries and role permissions correctly > - This branch also touches the issue detail and markdown editing flows operators use while handling advisory and triage work > - Partial issue cache seeds and fragile rich-editor parsing could leave important issue content missing or blank at the moment an operator needed it > - Blocked issues becoming actionable again should wake their assignee automatically instead of silently staying idle > - This pull request rebases the advisory follow-up branch onto current `master`, hardens authenticated route authorization, and carries the issue-detail/editor reliability fixes forward with regression tests > - The benefit is tighter authz on sensitive routes plus more reliable issue/advisory editing and wakeup behavior on top of the latest base ## What Changed - Hardened authenticated route authorization across agent, activity, approval, access, project, plugin, health, execution-workspace, portability, and related server paths, with new cross-tenant and runtime-authz regression coverage. - Switched issue detail queries from `initialData` to placeholder-based hydration so list/quicklook seeds still refetch full issue bodies. - Normalized advisory-style HTML images before mounting the markdown editor and strengthened fallback behavior when the rich editor silently fails or rejects the content. - Woke assigned agents when blocked issues move back to `todo`, with route coverage for reopen and unblock transitions. - Rebasing note: this branch now sits cleanly on top of the latest `master` tip used for the PR base. ## Verification - `pnpm exec vitest run ui/src/lib/issueDetailQuery.test.tsx ui/src/components/MarkdownEditor.test.tsx server/src/__tests__/issue-comment-reopen-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/activity-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/agent-cross-tenant-authz-routes.test.ts` - Confirmed `pnpm-lock.yaml` is not part of the PR diff. - Rebased the branch onto current `public-gh/master` before publishing. ## Risks - Broad authz tightening may expose existing flows that were relying on permissive board or agent access and now need explicit grants. - Markdown editor fallback changes could affect focus or rendering in edge-case content that mixes HTML-like advisory markup with normal markdown. - This verification was intentionally scoped to touched regressions and did not run the full repository suite. ## Model Used - OpenAI Codex, GPT-5-based coding agent in the Codex CLI environment with tool use for terminal, git, and GitHub operations. The exact runtime model identifier is not exposed inside this session. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] If this change affects the UI, it is behavior-only and does not need before/after screenshots - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes, or no documentation changes were needed for these internal fixes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-04-15 08:41:15 -05:00
import { assertAuthenticated, assertBoard, assertCompanyAccess } from "./authz.js";
fix(authz): scope import, approvals, activity, and heartbeat routes (#3315) ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents and company-scoped control-plane actions for zero-human companies. > - This change touches the server authz boundary around company portability, approvals, activity, and heartbeat-run operations. > - The vulnerability was that board-authenticated callers could cross company boundaries or create new companies through import paths without the same authorization checks enforced elsewhere. > - Once that gap existed, an attacker could chain it into higher-impact behavior through agent execution paths. > - The fix needed to harden every confirmed authorization gap in the reported chain, not just the first route that exposed it. > - This pull request adds the missing instance-admin and company-access checks and adds regression tests for each affected route. > - The benefit is that cross-company actions and new-company import flows now follow the same control-plane authorization rules as the rest of the product. ## What Changed - Required instance-admin access for `new_company` import preview/apply flows in `server/src/routes/companies.ts`. - Required company access before approval decision routes in `server/src/routes/approvals.ts`. - Required company access for activity creation and heartbeat-run issue listing in `server/src/routes/activity.ts`. - Required company access before heartbeat cancellation in `server/src/routes/agents.ts`. - Added regression coverage in the corresponding server route tests. ## Verification - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/company-portability-routes.test.ts src/__tests__/approval-routes-idempotency.test.ts src/__tests__/activity-routes.test.ts src/__tests__/agent-permissions-routes.test.ts` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` - Prior verification on the original security patch branch also included `pnpm build`. ## Risks - Low code risk: the change is narrow and only adds missing authorization gates to existing routes. - Operational risk: the advisory is already public, so this PR should be merged quickly to minimize the public unpatched window. - Residual product risk remains around open signup / bootstrap defaults, which was intentionally left out of this patch because the current first-user onboarding flow depends on it. ## Model Used - OpenAI GPT-5 Codex coding agent with tool use and local code execution in the Codex CLI environment. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [ ] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after screenshots - [ ] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge Co-authored-by: Forgotten <forgottenrunes@protonmail.com>
2026-04-10 11:55:27 -05:00
import { heartbeatService, issueService } from "../services/index.js";
import { sanitizeRecord } from "../redaction.js";
const createActivitySchema = z.object({
actorType: z.enum(["agent", "user", "system"]).optional().default("system"),
actorId: z.string().min(1),
action: z.string().min(1),
entityType: z.string().min(1),
entityId: z.string().min(1),
agentId: z.string().uuid().optional().nullable(),
details: z.record(z.unknown()).optional().nullable(),
});
export function activityRoutes(db: Db) {
const router = Router();
const svc = activityService(db);
fix(authz): scope import, approvals, activity, and heartbeat routes (#3315) ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents and company-scoped control-plane actions for zero-human companies. > - This change touches the server authz boundary around company portability, approvals, activity, and heartbeat-run operations. > - The vulnerability was that board-authenticated callers could cross company boundaries or create new companies through import paths without the same authorization checks enforced elsewhere. > - Once that gap existed, an attacker could chain it into higher-impact behavior through agent execution paths. > - The fix needed to harden every confirmed authorization gap in the reported chain, not just the first route that exposed it. > - This pull request adds the missing instance-admin and company-access checks and adds regression tests for each affected route. > - The benefit is that cross-company actions and new-company import flows now follow the same control-plane authorization rules as the rest of the product. ## What Changed - Required instance-admin access for `new_company` import preview/apply flows in `server/src/routes/companies.ts`. - Required company access before approval decision routes in `server/src/routes/approvals.ts`. - Required company access for activity creation and heartbeat-run issue listing in `server/src/routes/activity.ts`. - Required company access before heartbeat cancellation in `server/src/routes/agents.ts`. - Added regression coverage in the corresponding server route tests. ## Verification - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/company-portability-routes.test.ts src/__tests__/approval-routes-idempotency.test.ts src/__tests__/activity-routes.test.ts src/__tests__/agent-permissions-routes.test.ts` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` - Prior verification on the original security patch branch also included `pnpm build`. ## Risks - Low code risk: the change is narrow and only adds missing authorization gates to existing routes. - Operational risk: the advisory is already public, so this PR should be merged quickly to minimize the public unpatched window. - Residual product risk remains around open signup / bootstrap defaults, which was intentionally left out of this patch because the current first-user onboarding flow depends on it. ## Model Used - OpenAI GPT-5 Codex coding agent with tool use and local code execution in the Codex CLI environment. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [ ] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after screenshots - [ ] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge Co-authored-by: Forgotten <forgottenrunes@protonmail.com>
2026-04-10 11:55:27 -05:00
const heartbeat = heartbeatService(db);
const issueSvc = issueService(db);
async function resolveIssueByRef(rawId: string) {
if (/^[A-Z]+-\d+$/i.test(rawId)) {
return issueSvc.getByIdentifier(rawId);
}
return issueSvc.getById(rawId);
}
router.get("/companies/:companyId/activity", async (req, res) => {
const companyId = req.params.companyId as string;
assertCompanyAccess(req, companyId);
const filters = {
companyId,
agentId: req.query.agentId as string | undefined,
entityType: req.query.entityType as string | undefined,
entityId: req.query.entityId as string | undefined,
};
const result = await svc.list(filters);
res.json(result);
});
router.post("/companies/:companyId/activity", validate(createActivitySchema), async (req, res) => {
assertBoard(req);
const companyId = req.params.companyId as string;
fix(authz): scope import, approvals, activity, and heartbeat routes (#3315) ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents and company-scoped control-plane actions for zero-human companies. > - This change touches the server authz boundary around company portability, approvals, activity, and heartbeat-run operations. > - The vulnerability was that board-authenticated callers could cross company boundaries or create new companies through import paths without the same authorization checks enforced elsewhere. > - Once that gap existed, an attacker could chain it into higher-impact behavior through agent execution paths. > - The fix needed to harden every confirmed authorization gap in the reported chain, not just the first route that exposed it. > - This pull request adds the missing instance-admin and company-access checks and adds regression tests for each affected route. > - The benefit is that cross-company actions and new-company import flows now follow the same control-plane authorization rules as the rest of the product. ## What Changed - Required instance-admin access for `new_company` import preview/apply flows in `server/src/routes/companies.ts`. - Required company access before approval decision routes in `server/src/routes/approvals.ts`. - Required company access for activity creation and heartbeat-run issue listing in `server/src/routes/activity.ts`. - Required company access before heartbeat cancellation in `server/src/routes/agents.ts`. - Added regression coverage in the corresponding server route tests. ## Verification - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/company-portability-routes.test.ts src/__tests__/approval-routes-idempotency.test.ts src/__tests__/activity-routes.test.ts src/__tests__/agent-permissions-routes.test.ts` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` - Prior verification on the original security patch branch also included `pnpm build`. ## Risks - Low code risk: the change is narrow and only adds missing authorization gates to existing routes. - Operational risk: the advisory is already public, so this PR should be merged quickly to minimize the public unpatched window. - Residual product risk remains around open signup / bootstrap defaults, which was intentionally left out of this patch because the current first-user onboarding flow depends on it. ## Model Used - OpenAI GPT-5 Codex coding agent with tool use and local code execution in the Codex CLI environment. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [ ] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after screenshots - [ ] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge Co-authored-by: Forgotten <forgottenrunes@protonmail.com>
2026-04-10 11:55:27 -05:00
assertCompanyAccess(req, companyId);
const event = await svc.create({
companyId,
...req.body,
details: req.body.details ? sanitizeRecord(req.body.details) : null,
});
res.status(201).json(event);
});
router.get("/issues/:id/activity", async (req, res) => {
const rawId = req.params.id as string;
const issue = await resolveIssueByRef(rawId);
if (!issue) {
res.status(404).json({ error: "Issue not found" });
return;
}
assertCompanyAccess(req, issue.companyId);
const result = await svc.forIssue(issue.id);
res.json(result);
});
router.get("/issues/:id/runs", async (req, res) => {
const rawId = req.params.id as string;
const issue = await resolveIssueByRef(rawId);
if (!issue) {
res.status(404).json({ error: "Issue not found" });
return;
}
assertCompanyAccess(req, issue.companyId);
const result = await svc.runsForIssue(issue.companyId, issue.id);
res.json(result);
});
router.get("/heartbeat-runs/:runId/issues", async (req, res) => {
[codex] harden authenticated routes and issue editor reliability (#3741) ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents for zero-human companies > - The control plane depends on authenticated routes enforcing company boundaries and role permissions correctly > - This branch also touches the issue detail and markdown editing flows operators use while handling advisory and triage work > - Partial issue cache seeds and fragile rich-editor parsing could leave important issue content missing or blank at the moment an operator needed it > - Blocked issues becoming actionable again should wake their assignee automatically instead of silently staying idle > - This pull request rebases the advisory follow-up branch onto current `master`, hardens authenticated route authorization, and carries the issue-detail/editor reliability fixes forward with regression tests > - The benefit is tighter authz on sensitive routes plus more reliable issue/advisory editing and wakeup behavior on top of the latest base ## What Changed - Hardened authenticated route authorization across agent, activity, approval, access, project, plugin, health, execution-workspace, portability, and related server paths, with new cross-tenant and runtime-authz regression coverage. - Switched issue detail queries from `initialData` to placeholder-based hydration so list/quicklook seeds still refetch full issue bodies. - Normalized advisory-style HTML images before mounting the markdown editor and strengthened fallback behavior when the rich editor silently fails or rejects the content. - Woke assigned agents when blocked issues move back to `todo`, with route coverage for reopen and unblock transitions. - Rebasing note: this branch now sits cleanly on top of the latest `master` tip used for the PR base. ## Verification - `pnpm exec vitest run ui/src/lib/issueDetailQuery.test.tsx ui/src/components/MarkdownEditor.test.tsx server/src/__tests__/issue-comment-reopen-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/activity-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/agent-cross-tenant-authz-routes.test.ts` - Confirmed `pnpm-lock.yaml` is not part of the PR diff. - Rebased the branch onto current `public-gh/master` before publishing. ## Risks - Broad authz tightening may expose existing flows that were relying on permissive board or agent access and now need explicit grants. - Markdown editor fallback changes could affect focus or rendering in edge-case content that mixes HTML-like advisory markup with normal markdown. - This verification was intentionally scoped to touched regressions and did not run the full repository suite. ## Model Used - OpenAI Codex, GPT-5-based coding agent in the Codex CLI environment with tool use for terminal, git, and GitHub operations. The exact runtime model identifier is not exposed inside this session. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] If this change affects the UI, it is behavior-only and does not need before/after screenshots - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes, or no documentation changes were needed for these internal fixes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-04-15 08:41:15 -05:00
assertAuthenticated(req);
const runId = req.params.runId as string;
fix(authz): scope import, approvals, activity, and heartbeat routes (#3315) ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents and company-scoped control-plane actions for zero-human companies. > - This change touches the server authz boundary around company portability, approvals, activity, and heartbeat-run operations. > - The vulnerability was that board-authenticated callers could cross company boundaries or create new companies through import paths without the same authorization checks enforced elsewhere. > - Once that gap existed, an attacker could chain it into higher-impact behavior through agent execution paths. > - The fix needed to harden every confirmed authorization gap in the reported chain, not just the first route that exposed it. > - This pull request adds the missing instance-admin and company-access checks and adds regression tests for each affected route. > - The benefit is that cross-company actions and new-company import flows now follow the same control-plane authorization rules as the rest of the product. ## What Changed - Required instance-admin access for `new_company` import preview/apply flows in `server/src/routes/companies.ts`. - Required company access before approval decision routes in `server/src/routes/approvals.ts`. - Required company access for activity creation and heartbeat-run issue listing in `server/src/routes/activity.ts`. - Required company access before heartbeat cancellation in `server/src/routes/agents.ts`. - Added regression coverage in the corresponding server route tests. ## Verification - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/company-portability-routes.test.ts src/__tests__/approval-routes-idempotency.test.ts src/__tests__/activity-routes.test.ts src/__tests__/agent-permissions-routes.test.ts` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` - Prior verification on the original security patch branch also included `pnpm build`. ## Risks - Low code risk: the change is narrow and only adds missing authorization gates to existing routes. - Operational risk: the advisory is already public, so this PR should be merged quickly to minimize the public unpatched window. - Residual product risk remains around open signup / bootstrap defaults, which was intentionally left out of this patch because the current first-user onboarding flow depends on it. ## Model Used - OpenAI GPT-5 Codex coding agent with tool use and local code execution in the Codex CLI environment. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [ ] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after screenshots - [ ] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge Co-authored-by: Forgotten <forgottenrunes@protonmail.com>
2026-04-10 11:55:27 -05:00
const run = await heartbeat.getRun(runId);
if (!run) {
res.json([]);
return;
}
assertCompanyAccess(req, run.companyId);
const result = await svc.issuesForRun(runId);
res.json(result);
});
return router;
}