paperclip/server/src/__tests__/approval-routes-idempotency.test.ts

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import express from "express";
import request from "supertest";
import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
import { approvalRoutes } from "../routes/approvals.js";
import { errorHandler } from "../middleware/index.js";
const mockApprovalService = vi.hoisted(() => ({
list: vi.fn(),
getById: vi.fn(),
create: vi.fn(),
approve: vi.fn(),
reject: vi.fn(),
requestRevision: vi.fn(),
resubmit: vi.fn(),
listComments: vi.fn(),
addComment: vi.fn(),
}));
const mockHeartbeatService = vi.hoisted(() => ({
wakeup: vi.fn(),
}));
const mockIssueApprovalService = vi.hoisted(() => ({
listIssuesForApproval: vi.fn(),
linkManyForApproval: vi.fn(),
}));
const mockSecretService = vi.hoisted(() => ({
normalizeHireApprovalPayloadForPersistence: vi.fn(),
}));
const mockLogActivity = vi.hoisted(() => vi.fn());
vi.mock("../services/index.js", () => ({
approvalService: () => mockApprovalService,
heartbeatService: () => mockHeartbeatService,
issueApprovalService: () => mockIssueApprovalService,
logActivity: mockLogActivity,
secretService: () => mockSecretService,
}));
fix(authz): scope import, approvals, activity, and heartbeat routes (#3315) ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents and company-scoped control-plane actions for zero-human companies. > - This change touches the server authz boundary around company portability, approvals, activity, and heartbeat-run operations. > - The vulnerability was that board-authenticated callers could cross company boundaries or create new companies through import paths without the same authorization checks enforced elsewhere. > - Once that gap existed, an attacker could chain it into higher-impact behavior through agent execution paths. > - The fix needed to harden every confirmed authorization gap in the reported chain, not just the first route that exposed it. > - This pull request adds the missing instance-admin and company-access checks and adds regression tests for each affected route. > - The benefit is that cross-company actions and new-company import flows now follow the same control-plane authorization rules as the rest of the product. ## What Changed - Required instance-admin access for `new_company` import preview/apply flows in `server/src/routes/companies.ts`. - Required company access before approval decision routes in `server/src/routes/approvals.ts`. - Required company access for activity creation and heartbeat-run issue listing in `server/src/routes/activity.ts`. - Required company access before heartbeat cancellation in `server/src/routes/agents.ts`. - Added regression coverage in the corresponding server route tests. ## Verification - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/company-portability-routes.test.ts src/__tests__/approval-routes-idempotency.test.ts src/__tests__/activity-routes.test.ts src/__tests__/agent-permissions-routes.test.ts` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` - Prior verification on the original security patch branch also included `pnpm build`. ## Risks - Low code risk: the change is narrow and only adds missing authorization gates to existing routes. - Operational risk: the advisory is already public, so this PR should be merged quickly to minimize the public unpatched window. - Residual product risk remains around open signup / bootstrap defaults, which was intentionally left out of this patch because the current first-user onboarding flow depends on it. ## Model Used - OpenAI GPT-5 Codex coding agent with tool use and local code execution in the Codex CLI environment. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [ ] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after screenshots - [ ] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge Co-authored-by: Forgotten <forgottenrunes@protonmail.com>
2026-04-10 11:55:27 -05:00
function createApp(actorOverrides: Record<string, unknown> = {}) {
const app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use((req, _res, next) => {
(req as any).actor = {
type: "board",
userId: "user-1",
companyIds: ["company-1"],
source: "session",
isInstanceAdmin: false,
fix(authz): scope import, approvals, activity, and heartbeat routes (#3315) ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents and company-scoped control-plane actions for zero-human companies. > - This change touches the server authz boundary around company portability, approvals, activity, and heartbeat-run operations. > - The vulnerability was that board-authenticated callers could cross company boundaries or create new companies through import paths without the same authorization checks enforced elsewhere. > - Once that gap existed, an attacker could chain it into higher-impact behavior through agent execution paths. > - The fix needed to harden every confirmed authorization gap in the reported chain, not just the first route that exposed it. > - This pull request adds the missing instance-admin and company-access checks and adds regression tests for each affected route. > - The benefit is that cross-company actions and new-company import flows now follow the same control-plane authorization rules as the rest of the product. ## What Changed - Required instance-admin access for `new_company` import preview/apply flows in `server/src/routes/companies.ts`. - Required company access before approval decision routes in `server/src/routes/approvals.ts`. - Required company access for activity creation and heartbeat-run issue listing in `server/src/routes/activity.ts`. - Required company access before heartbeat cancellation in `server/src/routes/agents.ts`. - Added regression coverage in the corresponding server route tests. ## Verification - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/company-portability-routes.test.ts src/__tests__/approval-routes-idempotency.test.ts src/__tests__/activity-routes.test.ts src/__tests__/agent-permissions-routes.test.ts` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` - Prior verification on the original security patch branch also included `pnpm build`. ## Risks - Low code risk: the change is narrow and only adds missing authorization gates to existing routes. - Operational risk: the advisory is already public, so this PR should be merged quickly to minimize the public unpatched window. - Residual product risk remains around open signup / bootstrap defaults, which was intentionally left out of this patch because the current first-user onboarding flow depends on it. ## Model Used - OpenAI GPT-5 Codex coding agent with tool use and local code execution in the Codex CLI environment. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [ ] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after screenshots - [ ] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge Co-authored-by: Forgotten <forgottenrunes@protonmail.com>
2026-04-10 11:55:27 -05:00
...actorOverrides,
};
next();
});
app.use("/api", approvalRoutes({} as any));
app.use(errorHandler);
return app;
}
function createAgentApp() {
const app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use((req, _res, next) => {
(req as any).actor = {
type: "agent",
agentId: "agent-1",
companyId: "company-1",
source: "api_key",
isInstanceAdmin: false,
};
next();
});
app.use("/api", approvalRoutes({} as any));
app.use(errorHandler);
return app;
}
describe("approval routes idempotent retries", () => {
beforeEach(() => {
vi.clearAllMocks();
mockHeartbeatService.wakeup.mockResolvedValue({ id: "wake-1" });
mockIssueApprovalService.listIssuesForApproval.mockResolvedValue([{ id: "issue-1" }]);
mockLogActivity.mockResolvedValue(undefined);
});
it("does not emit duplicate approval side effects when approve is already resolved", async () => {
fix(authz): scope import, approvals, activity, and heartbeat routes (#3315) ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents and company-scoped control-plane actions for zero-human companies. > - This change touches the server authz boundary around company portability, approvals, activity, and heartbeat-run operations. > - The vulnerability was that board-authenticated callers could cross company boundaries or create new companies through import paths without the same authorization checks enforced elsewhere. > - Once that gap existed, an attacker could chain it into higher-impact behavior through agent execution paths. > - The fix needed to harden every confirmed authorization gap in the reported chain, not just the first route that exposed it. > - This pull request adds the missing instance-admin and company-access checks and adds regression tests for each affected route. > - The benefit is that cross-company actions and new-company import flows now follow the same control-plane authorization rules as the rest of the product. ## What Changed - Required instance-admin access for `new_company` import preview/apply flows in `server/src/routes/companies.ts`. - Required company access before approval decision routes in `server/src/routes/approvals.ts`. - Required company access for activity creation and heartbeat-run issue listing in `server/src/routes/activity.ts`. - Required company access before heartbeat cancellation in `server/src/routes/agents.ts`. - Added regression coverage in the corresponding server route tests. ## Verification - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/company-portability-routes.test.ts src/__tests__/approval-routes-idempotency.test.ts src/__tests__/activity-routes.test.ts src/__tests__/agent-permissions-routes.test.ts` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` - Prior verification on the original security patch branch also included `pnpm build`. ## Risks - Low code risk: the change is narrow and only adds missing authorization gates to existing routes. - Operational risk: the advisory is already public, so this PR should be merged quickly to minimize the public unpatched window. - Residual product risk remains around open signup / bootstrap defaults, which was intentionally left out of this patch because the current first-user onboarding flow depends on it. ## Model Used - OpenAI GPT-5 Codex coding agent with tool use and local code execution in the Codex CLI environment. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [ ] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after screenshots - [ ] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge Co-authored-by: Forgotten <forgottenrunes@protonmail.com>
2026-04-10 11:55:27 -05:00
mockApprovalService.getById.mockResolvedValue({
id: "approval-1",
companyId: "company-1",
type: "hire_agent",
status: "approved",
payload: {},
requestedByAgentId: "agent-1",
});
mockApprovalService.approve.mockResolvedValue({
approval: {
id: "approval-1",
companyId: "company-1",
type: "hire_agent",
status: "approved",
payload: {},
requestedByAgentId: "agent-1",
},
applied: false,
});
const res = await request(createApp())
.post("/api/approvals/approval-1/approve")
.send({});
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(mockIssueApprovalService.listIssuesForApproval).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(mockHeartbeatService.wakeup).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(mockLogActivity).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it("does not emit duplicate rejection logs when reject is already resolved", async () => {
fix(authz): scope import, approvals, activity, and heartbeat routes (#3315) ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents and company-scoped control-plane actions for zero-human companies. > - This change touches the server authz boundary around company portability, approvals, activity, and heartbeat-run operations. > - The vulnerability was that board-authenticated callers could cross company boundaries or create new companies through import paths without the same authorization checks enforced elsewhere. > - Once that gap existed, an attacker could chain it into higher-impact behavior through agent execution paths. > - The fix needed to harden every confirmed authorization gap in the reported chain, not just the first route that exposed it. > - This pull request adds the missing instance-admin and company-access checks and adds regression tests for each affected route. > - The benefit is that cross-company actions and new-company import flows now follow the same control-plane authorization rules as the rest of the product. ## What Changed - Required instance-admin access for `new_company` import preview/apply flows in `server/src/routes/companies.ts`. - Required company access before approval decision routes in `server/src/routes/approvals.ts`. - Required company access for activity creation and heartbeat-run issue listing in `server/src/routes/activity.ts`. - Required company access before heartbeat cancellation in `server/src/routes/agents.ts`. - Added regression coverage in the corresponding server route tests. ## Verification - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/company-portability-routes.test.ts src/__tests__/approval-routes-idempotency.test.ts src/__tests__/activity-routes.test.ts src/__tests__/agent-permissions-routes.test.ts` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` - Prior verification on the original security patch branch also included `pnpm build`. ## Risks - Low code risk: the change is narrow and only adds missing authorization gates to existing routes. - Operational risk: the advisory is already public, so this PR should be merged quickly to minimize the public unpatched window. - Residual product risk remains around open signup / bootstrap defaults, which was intentionally left out of this patch because the current first-user onboarding flow depends on it. ## Model Used - OpenAI GPT-5 Codex coding agent with tool use and local code execution in the Codex CLI environment. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [ ] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after screenshots - [ ] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge Co-authored-by: Forgotten <forgottenrunes@protonmail.com>
2026-04-10 11:55:27 -05:00
mockApprovalService.getById.mockResolvedValue({
id: "approval-1",
companyId: "company-1",
type: "hire_agent",
status: "rejected",
payload: {},
});
mockApprovalService.reject.mockResolvedValue({
approval: {
id: "approval-1",
companyId: "company-1",
type: "hire_agent",
status: "rejected",
payload: {},
},
applied: false,
});
const res = await request(createApp())
.post("/api/approvals/approval-1/reject")
.send({});
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(mockLogActivity).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
fix(authz): scope import, approvals, activity, and heartbeat routes (#3315) ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents and company-scoped control-plane actions for zero-human companies. > - This change touches the server authz boundary around company portability, approvals, activity, and heartbeat-run operations. > - The vulnerability was that board-authenticated callers could cross company boundaries or create new companies through import paths without the same authorization checks enforced elsewhere. > - Once that gap existed, an attacker could chain it into higher-impact behavior through agent execution paths. > - The fix needed to harden every confirmed authorization gap in the reported chain, not just the first route that exposed it. > - This pull request adds the missing instance-admin and company-access checks and adds regression tests for each affected route. > - The benefit is that cross-company actions and new-company import flows now follow the same control-plane authorization rules as the rest of the product. ## What Changed - Required instance-admin access for `new_company` import preview/apply flows in `server/src/routes/companies.ts`. - Required company access before approval decision routes in `server/src/routes/approvals.ts`. - Required company access for activity creation and heartbeat-run issue listing in `server/src/routes/activity.ts`. - Required company access before heartbeat cancellation in `server/src/routes/agents.ts`. - Added regression coverage in the corresponding server route tests. ## Verification - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/company-portability-routes.test.ts src/__tests__/approval-routes-idempotency.test.ts src/__tests__/activity-routes.test.ts src/__tests__/agent-permissions-routes.test.ts` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` - Prior verification on the original security patch branch also included `pnpm build`. ## Risks - Low code risk: the change is narrow and only adds missing authorization gates to existing routes. - Operational risk: the advisory is already public, so this PR should be merged quickly to minimize the public unpatched window. - Residual product risk remains around open signup / bootstrap defaults, which was intentionally left out of this patch because the current first-user onboarding flow depends on it. ## Model Used - OpenAI GPT-5 Codex coding agent with tool use and local code execution in the Codex CLI environment. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [ ] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after screenshots - [ ] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge Co-authored-by: Forgotten <forgottenrunes@protonmail.com>
2026-04-10 11:55:27 -05:00
it("rejects approval decisions for companies outside the caller scope", async () => {
mockApprovalService.getById.mockResolvedValue({
id: "approval-2",
companyId: "company-2",
type: "hire_agent",
status: "pending",
payload: {},
});
const res = await request(createApp())
.post("/api/approvals/approval-2/approve")
.send({});
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
expect(mockApprovalService.approve).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it("rejects approval revision requests for companies outside the caller scope", async () => {
mockApprovalService.getById.mockResolvedValue({
id: "approval-3",
companyId: "company-2",
type: "hire_agent",
status: "pending",
payload: {},
});
const res = await request(createApp())
.post("/api/approvals/approval-3/request-revision")
.send({ decisionNote: "Need changes" });
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
expect(mockApprovalService.requestRevision).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it("lets agents create generic issue-linked board approval requests", async () => {
mockApprovalService.create.mockResolvedValue({
id: "approval-1",
companyId: "company-1",
type: "request_board_approval",
requestedByAgentId: "agent-1",
requestedByUserId: null,
status: "pending",
payload: { title: "Approve hosting spend" },
decisionNote: null,
decidedByUserId: null,
decidedAt: null,
createdAt: new Date("2026-04-06T00:00:00.000Z"),
updatedAt: new Date("2026-04-06T00:00:00.000Z"),
});
const res = await request(createAgentApp())
.post("/api/companies/company-1/approvals")
.send({
type: "request_board_approval",
issueIds: ["00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001"],
payload: { title: "Approve hosting spend" },
});
expect(res.status).toBe(201);
expect(mockApprovalService.create).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
"company-1",
expect.objectContaining({
type: "request_board_approval",
requestedByAgentId: "agent-1",
requestedByUserId: null,
status: "pending",
decisionNote: null,
}),
);
expect(mockSecretService.normalizeHireApprovalPayloadForPersistence).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(mockIssueApprovalService.linkManyForApproval).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
"approval-1",
["00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001"],
{ agentId: "agent-1", userId: null },
);
expect(mockLogActivity).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.anything(),
expect.objectContaining({
companyId: "company-1",
actorType: "agent",
actorId: "agent-1",
action: "approval.created",
}),
);
});
});