2026-03-10 12:00:29 -04:00
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import express from "express";
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import request from "supertest";
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import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
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import { approvalRoutes } from "../routes/approvals.js";
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import { errorHandler } from "../middleware/index.js";
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const mockApprovalService = vi.hoisted(() => ({
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list: vi.fn(),
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getById: vi.fn(),
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create: vi.fn(),
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approve: vi.fn(),
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reject: vi.fn(),
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requestRevision: vi.fn(),
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resubmit: vi.fn(),
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listComments: vi.fn(),
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addComment: vi.fn(),
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}));
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const mockHeartbeatService = vi.hoisted(() => ({
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wakeup: vi.fn(),
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}));
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const mockIssueApprovalService = vi.hoisted(() => ({
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listIssuesForApproval: vi.fn(),
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linkManyForApproval: vi.fn(),
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}));
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const mockSecretService = vi.hoisted(() => ({
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normalizeHireApprovalPayloadForPersistence: vi.fn(),
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}));
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const mockLogActivity = vi.hoisted(() => vi.fn());
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vi.mock("../services/index.js", () => ({
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approvalService: () => mockApprovalService,
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heartbeatService: () => mockHeartbeatService,
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issueApprovalService: () => mockIssueApprovalService,
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logActivity: mockLogActivity,
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secretService: () => mockSecretService,
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}));
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fix(authz): scope import, approvals, activity, and heartbeat routes (#3315)
## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents and company-scoped control-plane
actions for zero-human companies.
> - This change touches the server authz boundary around company
portability, approvals, activity, and heartbeat-run operations.
> - The vulnerability was that board-authenticated callers could cross
company boundaries or create new companies through import paths without
the same authorization checks enforced elsewhere.
> - Once that gap existed, an attacker could chain it into higher-impact
behavior through agent execution paths.
> - The fix needed to harden every confirmed authorization gap in the
reported chain, not just the first route that exposed it.
> - This pull request adds the missing instance-admin and company-access
checks and adds regression tests for each affected route.
> - The benefit is that cross-company actions and new-company import
flows now follow the same control-plane authorization rules as the rest
of the product.
## What Changed
- Required instance-admin access for `new_company` import preview/apply
flows in `server/src/routes/companies.ts`.
- Required company access before approval decision routes in
`server/src/routes/approvals.ts`.
- Required company access for activity creation and heartbeat-run issue
listing in `server/src/routes/activity.ts`.
- Required company access before heartbeat cancellation in
`server/src/routes/agents.ts`.
- Added regression coverage in the corresponding server route tests.
## Verification
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run
src/__tests__/company-portability-routes.test.ts
src/__tests__/approval-routes-idempotency.test.ts
src/__tests__/activity-routes.test.ts
src/__tests__/agent-permissions-routes.test.ts`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck`
- Prior verification on the original security patch branch also included
`pnpm build`.
## Risks
- Low code risk: the change is narrow and only adds missing
authorization gates to existing routes.
- Operational risk: the advisory is already public, so this PR should be
merged quickly to minimize the public unpatched window.
- Residual product risk remains around open signup / bootstrap defaults,
which was intentionally left out of this patch because the current
first-user onboarding flow depends on it.
## Model Used
- OpenAI GPT-5 Codex coding agent with tool use and local code execution
in the Codex CLI environment.
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [ ] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after
screenshots
- [ ] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
Co-authored-by: Forgotten <forgottenrunes@protonmail.com>
2026-04-10 11:55:27 -05:00
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function createApp(actorOverrides: Record<string, unknown> = {}) {
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2026-03-10 12:00:29 -04:00
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const app = express();
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app.use(express.json());
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app.use((req, _res, next) => {
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(req as any).actor = {
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type: "board",
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userId: "user-1",
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companyIds: ["company-1"],
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source: "session",
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isInstanceAdmin: false,
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fix(authz): scope import, approvals, activity, and heartbeat routes (#3315)
## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents and company-scoped control-plane
actions for zero-human companies.
> - This change touches the server authz boundary around company
portability, approvals, activity, and heartbeat-run operations.
> - The vulnerability was that board-authenticated callers could cross
company boundaries or create new companies through import paths without
the same authorization checks enforced elsewhere.
> - Once that gap existed, an attacker could chain it into higher-impact
behavior through agent execution paths.
> - The fix needed to harden every confirmed authorization gap in the
reported chain, not just the first route that exposed it.
> - This pull request adds the missing instance-admin and company-access
checks and adds regression tests for each affected route.
> - The benefit is that cross-company actions and new-company import
flows now follow the same control-plane authorization rules as the rest
of the product.
## What Changed
- Required instance-admin access for `new_company` import preview/apply
flows in `server/src/routes/companies.ts`.
- Required company access before approval decision routes in
`server/src/routes/approvals.ts`.
- Required company access for activity creation and heartbeat-run issue
listing in `server/src/routes/activity.ts`.
- Required company access before heartbeat cancellation in
`server/src/routes/agents.ts`.
- Added regression coverage in the corresponding server route tests.
## Verification
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run
src/__tests__/company-portability-routes.test.ts
src/__tests__/approval-routes-idempotency.test.ts
src/__tests__/activity-routes.test.ts
src/__tests__/agent-permissions-routes.test.ts`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck`
- Prior verification on the original security patch branch also included
`pnpm build`.
## Risks
- Low code risk: the change is narrow and only adds missing
authorization gates to existing routes.
- Operational risk: the advisory is already public, so this PR should be
merged quickly to minimize the public unpatched window.
- Residual product risk remains around open signup / bootstrap defaults,
which was intentionally left out of this patch because the current
first-user onboarding flow depends on it.
## Model Used
- OpenAI GPT-5 Codex coding agent with tool use and local code execution
in the Codex CLI environment.
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [ ] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after
screenshots
- [ ] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
Co-authored-by: Forgotten <forgottenrunes@protonmail.com>
2026-04-10 11:55:27 -05:00
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...actorOverrides,
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2026-03-10 12:00:29 -04:00
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};
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next();
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});
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app.use("/api", approvalRoutes({} as any));
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app.use(errorHandler);
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return app;
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}
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2026-04-06 10:36:31 -05:00
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function createAgentApp() {
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const app = express();
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app.use(express.json());
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app.use((req, _res, next) => {
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(req as any).actor = {
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type: "agent",
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agentId: "agent-1",
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companyId: "company-1",
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source: "api_key",
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isInstanceAdmin: false,
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};
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next();
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});
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app.use("/api", approvalRoutes({} as any));
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app.use(errorHandler);
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return app;
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}
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2026-03-10 12:00:29 -04:00
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describe("approval routes idempotent retries", () => {
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beforeEach(() => {
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vi.clearAllMocks();
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mockHeartbeatService.wakeup.mockResolvedValue({ id: "wake-1" });
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mockIssueApprovalService.listIssuesForApproval.mockResolvedValue([{ id: "issue-1" }]);
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mockLogActivity.mockResolvedValue(undefined);
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});
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it("does not emit duplicate approval side effects when approve is already resolved", async () => {
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fix(authz): scope import, approvals, activity, and heartbeat routes (#3315)
## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents and company-scoped control-plane
actions for zero-human companies.
> - This change touches the server authz boundary around company
portability, approvals, activity, and heartbeat-run operations.
> - The vulnerability was that board-authenticated callers could cross
company boundaries or create new companies through import paths without
the same authorization checks enforced elsewhere.
> - Once that gap existed, an attacker could chain it into higher-impact
behavior through agent execution paths.
> - The fix needed to harden every confirmed authorization gap in the
reported chain, not just the first route that exposed it.
> - This pull request adds the missing instance-admin and company-access
checks and adds regression tests for each affected route.
> - The benefit is that cross-company actions and new-company import
flows now follow the same control-plane authorization rules as the rest
of the product.
## What Changed
- Required instance-admin access for `new_company` import preview/apply
flows in `server/src/routes/companies.ts`.
- Required company access before approval decision routes in
`server/src/routes/approvals.ts`.
- Required company access for activity creation and heartbeat-run issue
listing in `server/src/routes/activity.ts`.
- Required company access before heartbeat cancellation in
`server/src/routes/agents.ts`.
- Added regression coverage in the corresponding server route tests.
## Verification
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run
src/__tests__/company-portability-routes.test.ts
src/__tests__/approval-routes-idempotency.test.ts
src/__tests__/activity-routes.test.ts
src/__tests__/agent-permissions-routes.test.ts`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck`
- Prior verification on the original security patch branch also included
`pnpm build`.
## Risks
- Low code risk: the change is narrow and only adds missing
authorization gates to existing routes.
- Operational risk: the advisory is already public, so this PR should be
merged quickly to minimize the public unpatched window.
- Residual product risk remains around open signup / bootstrap defaults,
which was intentionally left out of this patch because the current
first-user onboarding flow depends on it.
## Model Used
- OpenAI GPT-5 Codex coding agent with tool use and local code execution
in the Codex CLI environment.
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [ ] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after
screenshots
- [ ] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
Co-authored-by: Forgotten <forgottenrunes@protonmail.com>
2026-04-10 11:55:27 -05:00
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mockApprovalService.getById.mockResolvedValue({
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id: "approval-1",
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companyId: "company-1",
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type: "hire_agent",
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status: "approved",
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payload: {},
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requestedByAgentId: "agent-1",
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});
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2026-03-10 12:00:29 -04:00
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mockApprovalService.approve.mockResolvedValue({
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approval: {
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id: "approval-1",
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companyId: "company-1",
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type: "hire_agent",
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status: "approved",
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payload: {},
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requestedByAgentId: "agent-1",
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},
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applied: false,
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});
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const res = await request(createApp())
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.post("/api/approvals/approval-1/approve")
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.send({});
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expect(res.status).toBe(200);
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expect(mockIssueApprovalService.listIssuesForApproval).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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expect(mockHeartbeatService.wakeup).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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expect(mockLogActivity).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it("does not emit duplicate rejection logs when reject is already resolved", async () => {
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fix(authz): scope import, approvals, activity, and heartbeat routes (#3315)
## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents and company-scoped control-plane
actions for zero-human companies.
> - This change touches the server authz boundary around company
portability, approvals, activity, and heartbeat-run operations.
> - The vulnerability was that board-authenticated callers could cross
company boundaries or create new companies through import paths without
the same authorization checks enforced elsewhere.
> - Once that gap existed, an attacker could chain it into higher-impact
behavior through agent execution paths.
> - The fix needed to harden every confirmed authorization gap in the
reported chain, not just the first route that exposed it.
> - This pull request adds the missing instance-admin and company-access
checks and adds regression tests for each affected route.
> - The benefit is that cross-company actions and new-company import
flows now follow the same control-plane authorization rules as the rest
of the product.
## What Changed
- Required instance-admin access for `new_company` import preview/apply
flows in `server/src/routes/companies.ts`.
- Required company access before approval decision routes in
`server/src/routes/approvals.ts`.
- Required company access for activity creation and heartbeat-run issue
listing in `server/src/routes/activity.ts`.
- Required company access before heartbeat cancellation in
`server/src/routes/agents.ts`.
- Added regression coverage in the corresponding server route tests.
## Verification
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run
src/__tests__/company-portability-routes.test.ts
src/__tests__/approval-routes-idempotency.test.ts
src/__tests__/activity-routes.test.ts
src/__tests__/agent-permissions-routes.test.ts`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck`
- Prior verification on the original security patch branch also included
`pnpm build`.
## Risks
- Low code risk: the change is narrow and only adds missing
authorization gates to existing routes.
- Operational risk: the advisory is already public, so this PR should be
merged quickly to minimize the public unpatched window.
- Residual product risk remains around open signup / bootstrap defaults,
which was intentionally left out of this patch because the current
first-user onboarding flow depends on it.
## Model Used
- OpenAI GPT-5 Codex coding agent with tool use and local code execution
in the Codex CLI environment.
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [ ] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after
screenshots
- [ ] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
Co-authored-by: Forgotten <forgottenrunes@protonmail.com>
2026-04-10 11:55:27 -05:00
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mockApprovalService.getById.mockResolvedValue({
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id: "approval-1",
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companyId: "company-1",
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type: "hire_agent",
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status: "rejected",
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payload: {},
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});
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2026-03-10 12:00:29 -04:00
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mockApprovalService.reject.mockResolvedValue({
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approval: {
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id: "approval-1",
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companyId: "company-1",
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type: "hire_agent",
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status: "rejected",
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payload: {},
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},
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applied: false,
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});
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const res = await request(createApp())
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.post("/api/approvals/approval-1/reject")
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.send({});
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expect(res.status).toBe(200);
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expect(mockLogActivity).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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2026-04-06 10:36:31 -05:00
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|
fix(authz): scope import, approvals, activity, and heartbeat routes (#3315)
## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents and company-scoped control-plane
actions for zero-human companies.
> - This change touches the server authz boundary around company
portability, approvals, activity, and heartbeat-run operations.
> - The vulnerability was that board-authenticated callers could cross
company boundaries or create new companies through import paths without
the same authorization checks enforced elsewhere.
> - Once that gap existed, an attacker could chain it into higher-impact
behavior through agent execution paths.
> - The fix needed to harden every confirmed authorization gap in the
reported chain, not just the first route that exposed it.
> - This pull request adds the missing instance-admin and company-access
checks and adds regression tests for each affected route.
> - The benefit is that cross-company actions and new-company import
flows now follow the same control-plane authorization rules as the rest
of the product.
## What Changed
- Required instance-admin access for `new_company` import preview/apply
flows in `server/src/routes/companies.ts`.
- Required company access before approval decision routes in
`server/src/routes/approvals.ts`.
- Required company access for activity creation and heartbeat-run issue
listing in `server/src/routes/activity.ts`.
- Required company access before heartbeat cancellation in
`server/src/routes/agents.ts`.
- Added regression coverage in the corresponding server route tests.
## Verification
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run
src/__tests__/company-portability-routes.test.ts
src/__tests__/approval-routes-idempotency.test.ts
src/__tests__/activity-routes.test.ts
src/__tests__/agent-permissions-routes.test.ts`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck`
- Prior verification on the original security patch branch also included
`pnpm build`.
## Risks
- Low code risk: the change is narrow and only adds missing
authorization gates to existing routes.
- Operational risk: the advisory is already public, so this PR should be
merged quickly to minimize the public unpatched window.
- Residual product risk remains around open signup / bootstrap defaults,
which was intentionally left out of this patch because the current
first-user onboarding flow depends on it.
## Model Used
- OpenAI GPT-5 Codex coding agent with tool use and local code execution
in the Codex CLI environment.
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [ ] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after
screenshots
- [ ] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
Co-authored-by: Forgotten <forgottenrunes@protonmail.com>
2026-04-10 11:55:27 -05:00
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it("rejects approval decisions for companies outside the caller scope", async () => {
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mockApprovalService.getById.mockResolvedValue({
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id: "approval-2",
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companyId: "company-2",
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type: "hire_agent",
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status: "pending",
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payload: {},
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});
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const res = await request(createApp())
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.post("/api/approvals/approval-2/approve")
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.send({});
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expect(res.status).toBe(403);
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expect(mockApprovalService.approve).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it("rejects approval revision requests for companies outside the caller scope", async () => {
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mockApprovalService.getById.mockResolvedValue({
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id: "approval-3",
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companyId: "company-2",
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type: "hire_agent",
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status: "pending",
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payload: {},
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});
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const res = await request(createApp())
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.post("/api/approvals/approval-3/request-revision")
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.send({ decisionNote: "Need changes" });
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expect(res.status).toBe(403);
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expect(mockApprovalService.requestRevision).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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2026-04-06 10:36:31 -05:00
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it("lets agents create generic issue-linked board approval requests", async () => {
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mockApprovalService.create.mockResolvedValue({
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id: "approval-1",
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companyId: "company-1",
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type: "request_board_approval",
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requestedByAgentId: "agent-1",
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requestedByUserId: null,
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status: "pending",
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payload: { title: "Approve hosting spend" },
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decisionNote: null,
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decidedByUserId: null,
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decidedAt: null,
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createdAt: new Date("2026-04-06T00:00:00.000Z"),
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updatedAt: new Date("2026-04-06T00:00:00.000Z"),
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|
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});
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const res = await request(createAgentApp())
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.post("/api/companies/company-1/approvals")
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.send({
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|
|
type: "request_board_approval",
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|
|
issueIds: ["00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001"],
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|
|
payload: { title: "Approve hosting spend" },
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|
});
|
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|
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expect(res.status).toBe(201);
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|
|
expect(mockApprovalService.create).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
|
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|
|
"company-1",
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|
|
|
expect.objectContaining({
|
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|
|
|
type: "request_board_approval",
|
|
|
|
|
requestedByAgentId: "agent-1",
|
|
|
|
|
requestedByUserId: null,
|
|
|
|
|
status: "pending",
|
|
|
|
|
decisionNote: null,
|
|
|
|
|
}),
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(mockSecretService.normalizeHireApprovalPayloadForPersistence).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
|
|
|
|
|
expect(mockIssueApprovalService.linkManyForApproval).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
|
|
|
|
|
"approval-1",
|
|
|
|
|
["00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001"],
|
|
|
|
|
{ agentId: "agent-1", userId: null },
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
expect(mockLogActivity).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
|
|
|
|
|
expect.anything(),
|
|
|
|
|
expect.objectContaining({
|
|
|
|
|
companyId: "company-1",
|
|
|
|
|
actorType: "agent",
|
|
|
|
|
actorId: "agent-1",
|
|
|
|
|
action: "approval.created",
|
|
|
|
|
}),
|
|
|
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
|
});
|
2026-03-10 12:00:29 -04:00
|
|
|
});
|