paperclip/server/src/routes/companies.ts

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import { Router, type Request } from "express";
import type { Db } from "@paperclipai/db";
import {
DEFAULT_FEEDBACK_DATA_SHARING_TERMS_VERSION,
companyPortabilityExportSchema,
companyPortabilityImportSchema,
companyPortabilityPreviewSchema,
createCompanySchema,
feedbackTargetTypeSchema,
feedbackTraceStatusSchema,
feedbackVoteValueSchema,
updateCompanyBrandingSchema,
updateCompanySchema,
} from "@paperclipai/shared";
import { badRequest, forbidden } from "../errors.js";
import { validate } from "../middleware/validate.js";
import {
accessService,
agentService,
budgetService,
companyPortabilityService,
companyService,
feedbackService,
logActivity,
} from "../services/index.js";
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import type { StorageService } from "../storage/types.js";
fix(authz): scope import, approvals, activity, and heartbeat routes (#3315) ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents and company-scoped control-plane actions for zero-human companies. > - This change touches the server authz boundary around company portability, approvals, activity, and heartbeat-run operations. > - The vulnerability was that board-authenticated callers could cross company boundaries or create new companies through import paths without the same authorization checks enforced elsewhere. > - Once that gap existed, an attacker could chain it into higher-impact behavior through agent execution paths. > - The fix needed to harden every confirmed authorization gap in the reported chain, not just the first route that exposed it. > - This pull request adds the missing instance-admin and company-access checks and adds regression tests for each affected route. > - The benefit is that cross-company actions and new-company import flows now follow the same control-plane authorization rules as the rest of the product. ## What Changed - Required instance-admin access for `new_company` import preview/apply flows in `server/src/routes/companies.ts`. - Required company access before approval decision routes in `server/src/routes/approvals.ts`. - Required company access for activity creation and heartbeat-run issue listing in `server/src/routes/activity.ts`. - Required company access before heartbeat cancellation in `server/src/routes/agents.ts`. - Added regression coverage in the corresponding server route tests. ## Verification - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/company-portability-routes.test.ts src/__tests__/approval-routes-idempotency.test.ts src/__tests__/activity-routes.test.ts src/__tests__/agent-permissions-routes.test.ts` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` - Prior verification on the original security patch branch also included `pnpm build`. ## Risks - Low code risk: the change is narrow and only adds missing authorization gates to existing routes. - Operational risk: the advisory is already public, so this PR should be merged quickly to minimize the public unpatched window. - Residual product risk remains around open signup / bootstrap defaults, which was intentionally left out of this patch because the current first-user onboarding flow depends on it. ## Model Used - OpenAI GPT-5 Codex coding agent with tool use and local code execution in the Codex CLI environment. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [ ] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after screenshots - [ ] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge Co-authored-by: Forgotten <forgottenrunes@protonmail.com>
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import { assertBoard, assertCompanyAccess, assertInstanceAdmin, getActorInfo } from "./authz.js";
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export function companyRoutes(db: Db, storage?: StorageService) {
const router = Router();
const svc = companyService(db);
const agents = agentService(db);
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const portability = companyPortabilityService(db, storage);
const access = accessService(db);
const budgets = budgetService(db);
const feedback = feedbackService(db);
function parseBooleanQuery(value: unknown) {
return value === true || value === "true" || value === "1";
}
function parseDateQuery(value: unknown, field: string) {
if (typeof value !== "string" || value.trim().length === 0) return undefined;
const parsed = new Date(value);
if (Number.isNaN(parsed.getTime())) {
throw badRequest(`Invalid ${field} query value`);
}
return parsed;
}
fix(authz): scope import, approvals, activity, and heartbeat routes (#3315) ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents and company-scoped control-plane actions for zero-human companies. > - This change touches the server authz boundary around company portability, approvals, activity, and heartbeat-run operations. > - The vulnerability was that board-authenticated callers could cross company boundaries or create new companies through import paths without the same authorization checks enforced elsewhere. > - Once that gap existed, an attacker could chain it into higher-impact behavior through agent execution paths. > - The fix needed to harden every confirmed authorization gap in the reported chain, not just the first route that exposed it. > - This pull request adds the missing instance-admin and company-access checks and adds regression tests for each affected route. > - The benefit is that cross-company actions and new-company import flows now follow the same control-plane authorization rules as the rest of the product. ## What Changed - Required instance-admin access for `new_company` import preview/apply flows in `server/src/routes/companies.ts`. - Required company access before approval decision routes in `server/src/routes/approvals.ts`. - Required company access for activity creation and heartbeat-run issue listing in `server/src/routes/activity.ts`. - Required company access before heartbeat cancellation in `server/src/routes/agents.ts`. - Added regression coverage in the corresponding server route tests. ## Verification - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/company-portability-routes.test.ts src/__tests__/approval-routes-idempotency.test.ts src/__tests__/activity-routes.test.ts src/__tests__/agent-permissions-routes.test.ts` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` - Prior verification on the original security patch branch also included `pnpm build`. ## Risks - Low code risk: the change is narrow and only adds missing authorization gates to existing routes. - Operational risk: the advisory is already public, so this PR should be merged quickly to minimize the public unpatched window. - Residual product risk remains around open signup / bootstrap defaults, which was intentionally left out of this patch because the current first-user onboarding flow depends on it. ## Model Used - OpenAI GPT-5 Codex coding agent with tool use and local code execution in the Codex CLI environment. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [ ] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after screenshots - [ ] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge Co-authored-by: Forgotten <forgottenrunes@protonmail.com>
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function assertImportTargetAccess(
req: Request,
target: { mode: "new_company" } | { mode: "existing_company"; companyId: string },
) {
if (target.mode === "new_company") {
assertInstanceAdmin(req);
return;
}
assertCompanyAccess(req, target.companyId);
}
async function assertCanUpdateBranding(req: Request, companyId: string) {
assertCompanyAccess(req, companyId);
if (req.actor.type === "board") return;
if (!req.actor.agentId) throw forbidden("Agent authentication required");
const actorAgent = await agents.getById(req.actor.agentId);
if (!actorAgent || actorAgent.companyId !== companyId) {
throw forbidden("Agent key cannot access another company");
}
if (actorAgent.role !== "ceo") {
throw forbidden("Only CEO agents can update company branding");
}
}
async function assertCanManagePortability(req: Request, companyId: string, capability: "imports" | "exports") {
assertCompanyAccess(req, companyId);
if (req.actor.type === "board") return;
if (!req.actor.agentId) throw forbidden("Agent authentication required");
const actorAgent = await agents.getById(req.actor.agentId);
if (!actorAgent || actorAgent.companyId !== companyId) {
throw forbidden("Agent key cannot access another company");
}
if (actorAgent.role !== "ceo") {
throw forbidden(`Only CEO agents can manage company ${capability}`);
}
}
router.get("/", async (req, res) => {
assertBoard(req);
const result = await svc.list();
if (req.actor.source === "local_implicit" || req.actor.isInstanceAdmin) {
res.json(result);
return;
}
const allowed = new Set(req.actor.companyIds ?? []);
res.json(result.filter((company) => allowed.has(company.id)));
});
router.get("/stats", async (req, res) => {
assertBoard(req);
const allowed = req.actor.source === "local_implicit" || req.actor.isInstanceAdmin
? null
: new Set(req.actor.companyIds ?? []);
const stats = await svc.stats();
if (!allowed) {
res.json(stats);
return;
}
const filtered = Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(stats).filter(([companyId]) => allowed.has(companyId)));
res.json(filtered);
});
// Common malformed path when companyId is empty in "/api/companies/{companyId}/issues".
router.get("/issues", (_req, res) => {
res.status(400).json({
error: "Missing companyId in path. Use /api/companies/{companyId}/issues.",
});
});
router.get("/:companyId", async (req, res) => {
const companyId = req.params.companyId as string;
assertCompanyAccess(req, companyId);
// Allow agents (CEO) to read their own company; board always allowed
if (req.actor.type !== "agent") {
assertBoard(req);
}
const company = await svc.getById(companyId);
if (!company) {
res.status(404).json({ error: "Company not found" });
return;
}
res.json(company);
});
router.get("/:companyId/feedback-traces", async (req, res) => {
const companyId = req.params.companyId as string;
assertCompanyAccess(req, companyId);
assertBoard(req);
const targetTypeRaw = typeof req.query.targetType === "string" ? req.query.targetType : undefined;
const voteRaw = typeof req.query.vote === "string" ? req.query.vote : undefined;
const statusRaw = typeof req.query.status === "string" ? req.query.status : undefined;
const issueId = typeof req.query.issueId === "string" && req.query.issueId.trim().length > 0 ? req.query.issueId : undefined;
const projectId = typeof req.query.projectId === "string" && req.query.projectId.trim().length > 0
? req.query.projectId
: undefined;
const traces = await feedback.listFeedbackTraces({
companyId,
issueId,
projectId,
targetType: targetTypeRaw ? feedbackTargetTypeSchema.parse(targetTypeRaw) : undefined,
vote: voteRaw ? feedbackVoteValueSchema.parse(voteRaw) : undefined,
status: statusRaw ? feedbackTraceStatusSchema.parse(statusRaw) : undefined,
from: parseDateQuery(req.query.from, "from"),
to: parseDateQuery(req.query.to, "to"),
sharedOnly: parseBooleanQuery(req.query.sharedOnly),
includePayload: parseBooleanQuery(req.query.includePayload),
});
res.json(traces);
});
router.post("/:companyId/export", validate(companyPortabilityExportSchema), async (req, res) => {
const companyId = req.params.companyId as string;
Harden API route authorization boundaries (#4122) ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents for zero-human companies. > - The REST API is the control-plane boundary for companies, agents, plugins, adapters, costs, invites, and issue mutations. > - Several routes still relied on broad board or company access checks without consistently enforcing the narrower actor, company, and active-checkout boundaries those operations require. > - That can allow agents or non-admin users to mutate sensitive resources outside the intended governance path. > - This pull request hardens the route authorization layer and adds regression coverage for the audited API surfaces. > - The benefit is tighter multi-company isolation, safer plugin and adapter administration, and stronger enforcement of active issue ownership. ## What Changed - Added route-level authorization checks for budgets, plugin administration/scoped routes, adapter management, company import/export, direct agent creation, invite test resolution, and issue mutation/write surfaces. - Enforced active checkout ownership for agent-authenticated issue mutations, while preserving explicit management overrides for permitted managers. - Restricted sensitive adapter and plugin management operations to instance-admin or properly scoped actors. - Tightened company portability and invite probing routes so agents cannot cross company boundaries. - Updated access constants and the Company Access UI copy for the new active-checkout management grant. - Added focused regression tests covering cross-company denial, agent self-mutation denial, admin-only operations, and active checkout ownership. - Rebased the branch onto `public-gh/master` and fixed validation fallout from the rebase: heartbeat-context route ordering and a company import/export e2e fixture that now opts out of direct-hire approval before using direct agent creation. - Updated onboarding and signoff e2e setup to create seed agents through `/agent-hires` plus board approval, so they remain compatible with the approval-gated new-agent default. - Addressed Greptile feedback by removing a duplicate company export API alias, avoiding N+1 reporting-chain lookups in active-checkout override checks, allowing agent mutations on unassigned `in_progress` issues, and blocking NAT64 invite-probe targets. ## Verification - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/issues-goal-context-routes.test.ts cli/src/__tests__/company-import-export-e2e.test.ts` - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/plugin-routes-authz.test.ts server/src/__tests__/adapter-routes-authz.test.ts server/src/__tests__/agent-permissions-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/company-portability-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/costs-service.test.ts server/src/__tests__/invite-test-resolution-route.test.ts server/src/__tests__/issue-agent-mutation-ownership-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/agent-adapter-validation-routes.test.ts` - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/issue-agent-mutation-ownership-routes.test.ts` - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/invite-test-resolution-route.test.ts` - `pnpm -r typecheck` - `pnpm --filter server typecheck` - `pnpm --filter ui typecheck` - `pnpm build` - `pnpm test:e2e -- tests/e2e/onboarding.spec.ts tests/e2e/signoff-policy.spec.ts` - `pnpm test:e2e -- tests/e2e/signoff-policy.spec.ts` - `pnpm test:run` was also run. It failed under default full-suite parallelism with two order-dependent failures in `plugin-routes-authz.test.ts` and `routines-e2e.test.ts`; both files passed when rerun directly together with `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/plugin-routes-authz.test.ts server/src/__tests__/routines-e2e.test.ts`. ## Risks - Medium risk: this changes authorization behavior across multiple sensitive API surfaces, so callers that depended on broad board/company access may now receive `403` or `409` until they use the correct governance path. - Direct agent creation now respects the company-level board-approval requirement; integrations that need pending hires should use `/api/companies/:companyId/agent-hires`. - Active in-progress issue mutations now require checkout ownership or an explicit management override, which may reveal workflow assumptions in older automation. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, GPT-5 coding agent, tool-using workflow with local shell, Git, GitHub CLI, and repository tests. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [ ] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after screenshots - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
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await assertCanManagePortability(req, companyId, "exports");
const result = await portability.exportBundle(companyId, req.body);
res.json(result);
});
router.post("/import/preview", validate(companyPortabilityPreviewSchema), async (req, res) => {
assertBoard(req);
fix(authz): scope import, approvals, activity, and heartbeat routes (#3315) ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents and company-scoped control-plane actions for zero-human companies. > - This change touches the server authz boundary around company portability, approvals, activity, and heartbeat-run operations. > - The vulnerability was that board-authenticated callers could cross company boundaries or create new companies through import paths without the same authorization checks enforced elsewhere. > - Once that gap existed, an attacker could chain it into higher-impact behavior through agent execution paths. > - The fix needed to harden every confirmed authorization gap in the reported chain, not just the first route that exposed it. > - This pull request adds the missing instance-admin and company-access checks and adds regression tests for each affected route. > - The benefit is that cross-company actions and new-company import flows now follow the same control-plane authorization rules as the rest of the product. ## What Changed - Required instance-admin access for `new_company` import preview/apply flows in `server/src/routes/companies.ts`. - Required company access before approval decision routes in `server/src/routes/approvals.ts`. - Required company access for activity creation and heartbeat-run issue listing in `server/src/routes/activity.ts`. - Required company access before heartbeat cancellation in `server/src/routes/agents.ts`. - Added regression coverage in the corresponding server route tests. ## Verification - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/company-portability-routes.test.ts src/__tests__/approval-routes-idempotency.test.ts src/__tests__/activity-routes.test.ts src/__tests__/agent-permissions-routes.test.ts` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` - Prior verification on the original security patch branch also included `pnpm build`. ## Risks - Low code risk: the change is narrow and only adds missing authorization gates to existing routes. - Operational risk: the advisory is already public, so this PR should be merged quickly to minimize the public unpatched window. - Residual product risk remains around open signup / bootstrap defaults, which was intentionally left out of this patch because the current first-user onboarding flow depends on it. ## Model Used - OpenAI GPT-5 Codex coding agent with tool use and local code execution in the Codex CLI environment. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [ ] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after screenshots - [ ] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge Co-authored-by: Forgotten <forgottenrunes@protonmail.com>
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assertImportTargetAccess(req, req.body.target);
const preview = await portability.previewImport(req.body);
res.json(preview);
});
router.post("/import", validate(companyPortabilityImportSchema), async (req, res) => {
assertBoard(req);
fix(authz): scope import, approvals, activity, and heartbeat routes (#3315) ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents and company-scoped control-plane actions for zero-human companies. > - This change touches the server authz boundary around company portability, approvals, activity, and heartbeat-run operations. > - The vulnerability was that board-authenticated callers could cross company boundaries or create new companies through import paths without the same authorization checks enforced elsewhere. > - Once that gap existed, an attacker could chain it into higher-impact behavior through agent execution paths. > - The fix needed to harden every confirmed authorization gap in the reported chain, not just the first route that exposed it. > - This pull request adds the missing instance-admin and company-access checks and adds regression tests for each affected route. > - The benefit is that cross-company actions and new-company import flows now follow the same control-plane authorization rules as the rest of the product. ## What Changed - Required instance-admin access for `new_company` import preview/apply flows in `server/src/routes/companies.ts`. - Required company access before approval decision routes in `server/src/routes/approvals.ts`. - Required company access for activity creation and heartbeat-run issue listing in `server/src/routes/activity.ts`. - Required company access before heartbeat cancellation in `server/src/routes/agents.ts`. - Added regression coverage in the corresponding server route tests. ## Verification - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/company-portability-routes.test.ts src/__tests__/approval-routes-idempotency.test.ts src/__tests__/activity-routes.test.ts src/__tests__/agent-permissions-routes.test.ts` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` - Prior verification on the original security patch branch also included `pnpm build`. ## Risks - Low code risk: the change is narrow and only adds missing authorization gates to existing routes. - Operational risk: the advisory is already public, so this PR should be merged quickly to minimize the public unpatched window. - Residual product risk remains around open signup / bootstrap defaults, which was intentionally left out of this patch because the current first-user onboarding flow depends on it. ## Model Used - OpenAI GPT-5 Codex coding agent with tool use and local code execution in the Codex CLI environment. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [ ] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after screenshots - [ ] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge Co-authored-by: Forgotten <forgottenrunes@protonmail.com>
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assertImportTargetAccess(req, req.body.target);
const actor = getActorInfo(req);
const result = await portability.importBundle(req.body, req.actor.type === "board" ? req.actor.userId : null);
await logActivity(db, {
companyId: result.company.id,
actorType: actor.actorType,
actorId: actor.actorId,
action: "company.imported",
entityType: "company",
entityId: result.company.id,
agentId: actor.agentId,
runId: actor.runId,
details: {
include: req.body.include ?? null,
agentCount: result.agents.length,
warningCount: result.warnings.length,
companyAction: result.company.action,
},
});
res.json(result);
});
router.post("/:companyId/exports/preview", validate(companyPortabilityExportSchema), async (req, res) => {
const companyId = req.params.companyId as string;
await assertCanManagePortability(req, companyId, "exports");
const preview = await portability.previewExport(companyId, req.body);
res.json(preview);
});
router.post("/:companyId/exports", validate(companyPortabilityExportSchema), async (req, res) => {
const companyId = req.params.companyId as string;
await assertCanManagePortability(req, companyId, "exports");
const result = await portability.exportBundle(companyId, req.body);
res.json(result);
});
router.post("/:companyId/imports/preview", validate(companyPortabilityPreviewSchema), async (req, res) => {
const companyId = req.params.companyId as string;
await assertCanManagePortability(req, companyId, "imports");
if (req.body.target.mode === "existing_company" && req.body.target.companyId !== companyId) {
throw forbidden("Safe import route can only target the route company");
}
if (req.body.collisionStrategy === "replace") {
throw forbidden("Safe import route does not allow replace collision strategy");
}
const preview = await portability.previewImport(req.body, {
mode: "agent_safe",
sourceCompanyId: companyId,
});
res.json(preview);
});
router.post("/:companyId/imports/apply", validate(companyPortabilityImportSchema), async (req, res) => {
const companyId = req.params.companyId as string;
await assertCanManagePortability(req, companyId, "imports");
if (req.body.target.mode === "existing_company" && req.body.target.companyId !== companyId) {
throw forbidden("Safe import route can only target the route company");
}
if (req.body.collisionStrategy === "replace") {
throw forbidden("Safe import route does not allow replace collision strategy");
}
const actor = getActorInfo(req);
const result = await portability.importBundle(req.body, req.actor.type === "board" ? req.actor.userId : null, {
mode: "agent_safe",
sourceCompanyId: companyId,
});
await logActivity(db, {
companyId: result.company.id,
actorType: actor.actorType,
actorId: actor.actorId,
entityType: "company",
entityId: result.company.id,
agentId: actor.agentId,
runId: actor.runId,
action: "company.imported",
details: {
include: req.body.include ?? null,
agentCount: result.agents.length,
warningCount: result.warnings.length,
companyAction: result.company.action,
importMode: "agent_safe",
},
});
res.json(result);
});
router.post("/", validate(createCompanySchema), async (req, res) => {
assertBoard(req);
if (!(req.actor.source === "local_implicit" || req.actor.isInstanceAdmin)) {
throw forbidden("Instance admin required");
}
const company = await svc.create(req.body);
await access.ensureMembership(company.id, "user", req.actor.userId ?? "local-board", "owner", "active");
await logActivity(db, {
companyId: company.id,
actorType: "user",
actorId: req.actor.userId ?? "board",
action: "company.created",
entityType: "company",
entityId: company.id,
details: { name: company.name },
});
if (company.budgetMonthlyCents > 0) {
await budgets.upsertPolicy(
company.id,
{
scopeType: "company",
scopeId: company.id,
amount: company.budgetMonthlyCents,
windowKind: "calendar_month_utc",
},
req.actor.userId ?? "board",
);
}
res.status(201).json(company);
});
router.patch("/:companyId", async (req, res) => {
const companyId = req.params.companyId as string;
assertCompanyAccess(req, companyId);
const actor = getActorInfo(req);
const existingCompany = await svc.getById(companyId);
if (!existingCompany) {
res.status(404).json({ error: "Company not found" });
return;
}
let body: Record<string, unknown>;
if (req.actor.type === "agent") {
// Only CEO agents may update company branding fields
const agentSvc = agentService(db);
const actorAgent = req.actor.agentId ? await agentSvc.getById(req.actor.agentId) : null;
if (!actorAgent || actorAgent.role !== "ceo") {
throw forbidden("Only CEO agents or board users may update company settings");
}
if (actorAgent.companyId !== companyId) {
throw forbidden("Agent key cannot access another company");
}
body = updateCompanyBrandingSchema.parse(req.body);
} else {
assertBoard(req);
body = updateCompanySchema.parse(req.body);
if (body.feedbackDataSharingEnabled === true && !existingCompany.feedbackDataSharingEnabled) {
body = {
...body,
feedbackDataSharingConsentAt: new Date(),
feedbackDataSharingConsentByUserId: req.actor.userId ?? "local-board",
feedbackDataSharingTermsVersion:
typeof body.feedbackDataSharingTermsVersion === "string" && body.feedbackDataSharingTermsVersion.length > 0
? body.feedbackDataSharingTermsVersion
: DEFAULT_FEEDBACK_DATA_SHARING_TERMS_VERSION,
};
}
}
const company = await svc.update(companyId, body);
if (!company) {
res.status(404).json({ error: "Company not found" });
return;
}
await logActivity(db, {
companyId,
actorType: actor.actorType,
actorId: actor.actorId,
agentId: actor.agentId,
runId: actor.runId,
action: "company.updated",
entityType: "company",
entityId: companyId,
details: body,
});
res.json(company);
});
router.patch("/:companyId/branding", validate(updateCompanyBrandingSchema), async (req, res) => {
const companyId = req.params.companyId as string;
await assertCanUpdateBranding(req, companyId);
const company = await svc.update(companyId, req.body);
if (!company) {
res.status(404).json({ error: "Company not found" });
return;
}
const actor = getActorInfo(req);
await logActivity(db, {
companyId,
actorType: actor.actorType,
actorId: actor.actorId,
agentId: actor.agentId,
runId: actor.runId,
action: "company.branding_updated",
entityType: "company",
entityId: companyId,
details: req.body,
});
res.json(company);
});
router.post("/:companyId/archive", async (req, res) => {
assertBoard(req);
const companyId = req.params.companyId as string;
assertCompanyAccess(req, companyId);
const company = await svc.archive(companyId);
if (!company) {
res.status(404).json({ error: "Company not found" });
return;
}
await logActivity(db, {
companyId,
actorType: "user",
actorId: req.actor.userId ?? "board",
action: "company.archived",
entityType: "company",
entityId: companyId,
});
res.json(company);
});
router.delete("/:companyId", async (req, res) => {
assertBoard(req);
const companyId = req.params.companyId as string;
assertCompanyAccess(req, companyId);
const company = await svc.remove(companyId);
if (!company) {
res.status(404).json({ error: "Company not found" });
return;
}
res.json({ ok: true });
});
return router;
}