[codex] Add agent permissions and controls plan (#6386)

## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents for zero-human companies by keeping
task ownership, approvals, and operator control inside one control
plane.
> - Agent permissions and plugin-hosted company settings sit on the
boundary between autonomy and governance.
> - V1 needs scoped task assignment rules, plugin extension points, and
clearer company access surfaces without weakening company boundaries.
> - The branch builds the core authorization service, plugin SDK/host
APIs, and UI simplifications needed to support those controls.
> - Paperclip EE plugin surfaces were intentionally moved out of this
core PR per review direction, so this PR now carries only the public
core/plugin infrastructure work.
> - The latest updates preserve the PAP-9937 branch changes that belong
in this PR, remove the `design/` artifacts, and exclude the experimental
`plugin-briefs` package.
> - Greptile feedback was applied through the authorization/audit paths
and the final cleanup commit was re-reviewed at 5/5 with no unresolved
Greptile threads.
> - The benefit is safer assignment control with extension hooks for
richer permission products while preserving simple defaults for normal
operators.

## What Changed

- Added scoped task-assignment authorization decisions and routed
issue/agent assignment mutations through the authorization service.
- Added plugin SDK and host APIs for company settings slots,
authorization policy/grant management, assignment previews, and bridge
invocation scope propagation.
- Simplified core company access UI and moved advanced controls behind
plugin-provided settings surfaces.
- Added retry-now affordances for blocked issue next-step notices.
- Added protected-assignment enforcement for persisted
agent/project/issue policies, including explicit-grant fallback
behavior.
- Added incremental principal-access compatibility backfill for active
agent memberships and role-default human permission grants.
- Added the Markdown code block wrap action fix from the latest branch
changes.
- Removed `design/` artifacts from the PR and removed
`packages/plugins/plugin-briefs` from the final diff.
- Addressed Greptile feedback for plugin actor sanitization, legacy
membership handling, audit pagination, unknown grant-scope metadata, and
startup test mocks.

## Verification

- `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/access-service.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/company-portability.test.ts` -> 2 files passed, 54
tests passed.
- `pnpm exec vitest run
server/src/__tests__/server-startup-feedback-export.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/access-service.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/company-portability.test.ts` -> 3 files passed, 62
tests passed.
- `pnpm exec vitest run
server/src/__tests__/authorization-service.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/plugin-access-authorization-host-services.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/server-startup-feedback-export.test.ts` -> 3 files
passed, 28 tests passed.
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` -> passed.
- `git diff --check` -> passed.
- `node ./scripts/check-docker-deps-stage.mjs` -> passed.
- `CI=true pnpm install --frozen-lockfile --ignore-scripts` -> passed
with no lockfile update.
- `pnpm exec vitest run
ui/src/components/MarkdownBody.interaction.test.tsx` -> 1 test passed.
- `git ls-files design packages/plugins/plugin-briefs | wc -l` -> 0.
- GitHub CI on `40cd83b53` -> all checks passed, merge state `CLEAN`.
- Greptile on `40cd83b53` -> 5/5, 102 files reviewed, 0
comments/annotations added, 0 unresolved review threads.
- Confirmed the PR diff contains no `design/`,
`packages/plugins/plugin-briefs`, `pnpm-lock.yaml`, or
`.github/workflows` changes.

## Risks

- Medium: task assignment authorization paths are behaviorally stricter
for protected/private policy data, so existing plugin-authored policies
may block assignment until explicit grants or approval flows are
configured.
- Medium: plugin-host authorization APIs expand the surface area
available to trusted plugins and need careful review for company
scoping.
- Low: startup now performs a principal-access compatibility backfill,
but the migration and runtime backfill use conflict-tolerant inserts.

> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.

## Model Used

- OpenAI Codex, GPT-5 coding agent, tool-enabled workflow with shell,
git, and GitHub CLI access.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after
screenshots
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
This commit is contained in:
Dotta 2026-05-22 08:12:52 -05:00 committed by GitHub
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102 changed files with 6744 additions and 395 deletions

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@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ runWorker(plugin, import.meta.url);
| `onValidateConfig?(config)` | Optional. Return `{ ok, warnings?, errors? }` for settings UI / Test Connection. |
| `onWebhook?(input)` | Optional. Handle `POST /api/plugins/:pluginId/webhooks/:endpointKey`; required if webhooks declared. |
**Context (`ctx`) in setup:** `config`, `localFolders`, `events`, `jobs`, `launchers`, `http`, `secrets`, `activity`, `state`, `entities`, `projects`, `companies`, `issues`, `agents`, `goals`, `data`, `actions`, `streams`, `tools`, `metrics`, `logger`, `manifest`. Worker-side host APIs are capability-gated; declare capabilities in the manifest.
**Context (`ctx`) in setup:** `config`, `localFolders`, `events`, `jobs`, `launchers`, `http`, `secrets`, `activity`, `state`, `entities`, `projects`, `companies`, `issues`, `agents`, `goals`, `access`, `authorization`, `data`, `actions`, `streams`, `tools`, `metrics`, `logger`, `manifest`. Worker-side host APIs are capability-gated; declare capabilities in the manifest.
**Agents:** `ctx.agents.invoke(agentId, companyId, opts)` for one-shot invocation. `ctx.agents.sessions` for two-way chat: `create`, `list`, `sendMessage` (with streaming `onEvent` callback), `close`. See the [Plugin Authoring Guide](../../doc/plugins/PLUGIN_AUTHORING_GUIDE.md#agent-sessions-two-way-chat) for details.
@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ Subscribe in `setup` with `ctx.events.on(name, handler)` or `ctx.events.on(name,
**Filter (optional):** Pass a second argument to `on()`: `{ projectId?, companyId?, agentId? }` so the host only delivers matching events.
**Company context:** Events still carry `companyId` for company-scoped data, but plugin installation and activation are instance-wide in the current runtime.
**Company context:** Events still carry `companyId` for company-scoped data, but plugin installation and activation are instance-wide in the current runtime. Access and authorization host services require an active company-scoped invocation such as an event, API route, tool run, environment call, or UI bridge call; the requested `companyId` must match that active scope.
## Scheduled (recurring) jobs
@ -321,6 +321,11 @@ Declare in `manifest.capabilities`. Grouped by scope:
| | `activity.read` |
| | `costs.read` |
| | `issues.orchestration.read` |
| | `access.members.read` |
| | `access.invites.read` |
| | `authorization.grants.read` |
| | `authorization.policies.read` |
| | `authorization.audit.read` |
| | `database.namespace.read` |
| | `issues.create` |
| | `issues.update` |
@ -348,6 +353,10 @@ Declare in `manifest.capabilities`. Grouped by scope:
| | `local.folders` |
| **Agent** | `agent.tools.register` |
| | `agents.invoke` |
| | `access.members.write` |
| | `access.invites.write` |
| | `authorization.grants.write` |
| | `authorization.policies.write` |
| | `agent.sessions.create` |
| | `agent.sessions.list` |
| | `agent.sessions.send` |