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[codex] Add agent permissions and controls plan (#6386)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents for zero-human companies by keeping task ownership, approvals, and operator control inside one control plane. > - Agent permissions and plugin-hosted company settings sit on the boundary between autonomy and governance. > - V1 needs scoped task assignment rules, plugin extension points, and clearer company access surfaces without weakening company boundaries. > - The branch builds the core authorization service, plugin SDK/host APIs, and UI simplifications needed to support those controls. > - Paperclip EE plugin surfaces were intentionally moved out of this core PR per review direction, so this PR now carries only the public core/plugin infrastructure work. > - The latest updates preserve the PAP-9937 branch changes that belong in this PR, remove the `design/` artifacts, and exclude the experimental `plugin-briefs` package. > - Greptile feedback was applied through the authorization/audit paths and the final cleanup commit was re-reviewed at 5/5 with no unresolved Greptile threads. > - The benefit is safer assignment control with extension hooks for richer permission products while preserving simple defaults for normal operators. ## What Changed - Added scoped task-assignment authorization decisions and routed issue/agent assignment mutations through the authorization service. - Added plugin SDK and host APIs for company settings slots, authorization policy/grant management, assignment previews, and bridge invocation scope propagation. - Simplified core company access UI and moved advanced controls behind plugin-provided settings surfaces. - Added retry-now affordances for blocked issue next-step notices. - Added protected-assignment enforcement for persisted agent/project/issue policies, including explicit-grant fallback behavior. - Added incremental principal-access compatibility backfill for active agent memberships and role-default human permission grants. - Added the Markdown code block wrap action fix from the latest branch changes. - Removed `design/` artifacts from the PR and removed `packages/plugins/plugin-briefs` from the final diff. - Addressed Greptile feedback for plugin actor sanitization, legacy membership handling, audit pagination, unknown grant-scope metadata, and startup test mocks. ## Verification - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/access-service.test.ts server/src/__tests__/company-portability.test.ts` -> 2 files passed, 54 tests passed. - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/server-startup-feedback-export.test.ts server/src/__tests__/access-service.test.ts server/src/__tests__/company-portability.test.ts` -> 3 files passed, 62 tests passed. - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/authorization-service.test.ts server/src/__tests__/plugin-access-authorization-host-services.test.ts server/src/__tests__/server-startup-feedback-export.test.ts` -> 3 files passed, 28 tests passed. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` -> passed. - `git diff --check` -> passed. - `node ./scripts/check-docker-deps-stage.mjs` -> passed. - `CI=true pnpm install --frozen-lockfile --ignore-scripts` -> passed with no lockfile update. - `pnpm exec vitest run ui/src/components/MarkdownBody.interaction.test.tsx` -> 1 test passed. - `git ls-files design packages/plugins/plugin-briefs | wc -l` -> 0. - GitHub CI on `40cd83b53` -> all checks passed, merge state `CLEAN`. - Greptile on `40cd83b53` -> 5/5, 102 files reviewed, 0 comments/annotations added, 0 unresolved review threads. - Confirmed the PR diff contains no `design/`, `packages/plugins/plugin-briefs`, `pnpm-lock.yaml`, or `.github/workflows` changes. ## Risks - Medium: task assignment authorization paths are behaviorally stricter for protected/private policy data, so existing plugin-authored policies may block assignment until explicit grants or approval flows are configured. - Medium: plugin-host authorization APIs expand the surface area available to trusted plugins and need careful review for company scoping. - Low: startup now performs a principal-access compatibility backfill, but the migration and runtime backfill use conflict-tolerant inserts. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used - OpenAI Codex, GPT-5 coding agent, tool-enabled workflow with shell, git, and GitHub CLI access. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after screenshots - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
This commit is contained in:
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GitHub
parent
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commit
38c185fb8b
102 changed files with 6744 additions and 395 deletions
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@ -1246,29 +1246,48 @@ export function issueRoutes(
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return (req.actor.companyIds ?? []).includes(companyId);
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}
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function canCreateAgentsLegacy(agent: { permissions: Record<string, unknown> | null | undefined; role: string }) {
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if (agent.role === "ceo") return true;
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if (!agent.permissions || typeof agent.permissions !== "object") return false;
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return Boolean((agent.permissions as Record<string, unknown>).canCreateAgents);
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type TaskAssignmentAuthorizationScope = {
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issueId?: string | null;
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projectId?: string | null;
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parentIssueId?: string | null;
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assigneeAgentId?: string | null;
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assigneeUserId?: string | null;
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};
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async function resolveAssignmentProjectId(input: {
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companyId: string;
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projectId: string | null | undefined;
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parentIssueId?: string | null;
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}) {
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if (input.projectId !== undefined) return input.projectId;
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if (!input.parentIssueId) return null;
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const parent = await svc.getById(input.parentIssueId);
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if (!parent || parent.companyId !== input.companyId) return null;
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return parent.projectId ?? null;
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}
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async function assertCanAssignTasks(req: Request, companyId: string) {
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async function assertCanAssignTasks(
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req: Request,
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companyId: string,
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assignmentScope?: TaskAssignmentAuthorizationScope,
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) {
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assertCompanyAccess(req, companyId);
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if (req.actor.type === "board") {
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if (req.actor.source === "local_implicit" || req.actor.isInstanceAdmin) return;
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const allowed = await access.canUser(companyId, req.actor.userId, "tasks:assign");
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if (!allowed) throw forbidden("Missing permission: tasks:assign");
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return;
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}
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if (req.actor.type === "agent") {
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if (!req.actor.agentId) throw forbidden("Agent authentication required");
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const allowedByGrant = await access.hasPermission(companyId, "agent", req.actor.agentId, "tasks:assign");
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if (allowedByGrant) return;
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const actorAgent = await agentsSvc.getById(req.actor.agentId);
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if (actorAgent && actorAgent.companyId === companyId && canCreateAgentsLegacy(actorAgent)) return;
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throw forbidden("Missing permission: tasks:assign");
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}
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throw unauthorized();
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const decision = await access.decide({
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actor: req.actor,
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action: "tasks:assign",
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resource: {
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type: "issue",
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companyId,
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issueId: assignmentScope?.issueId ?? null,
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projectId: assignmentScope?.projectId ?? null,
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parentIssueId: assignmentScope?.parentIssueId ?? null,
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assigneeAgentId: assignmentScope?.assigneeAgentId ?? null,
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assigneeUserId: assignmentScope?.assigneeUserId ?? null,
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},
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scope: assignmentScope ?? null,
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});
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if (decision.allowed) return;
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throw forbidden(decision.explanation);
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}
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function requireAgentRunId(req: Request, res: Response) {
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@ -1284,31 +1303,12 @@ export function issueRoutes(
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companyId: string,
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assigneeAgentId: string,
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) {
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const allowedByGrant = await access.hasPermission(
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companyId,
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"agent",
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actorAgentId,
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"tasks:manage_active_checkouts",
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);
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if (allowedByGrant) return true;
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const companyAgents = await agentsSvc.list(companyId);
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const agentsById = new Map(companyAgents.map((agent) => [agent.id, agent]));
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const actorAgent = agentsById.get(actorAgentId);
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if (!actorAgent) return false;
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if (canCreateAgentsLegacy(actorAgent)) return true;
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// Reporting-chain managers may intervene in an agent's active checkout
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// without taking the task over. Peers must own the checkout/run first.
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let cursor: string | null = assigneeAgentId;
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for (let depth = 0; cursor && depth < 50; depth += 1) {
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const assignee = agentsById.get(cursor);
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if (!assignee) return false;
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if (assignee.reportsTo === actorAgentId) return true;
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cursor = assignee.reportsTo;
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}
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return false;
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const decision = await access.decide({
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actor: { type: "agent", agentId: actorAgentId, companyId },
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action: "tasks:manage_active_checkouts",
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resource: { type: "issue", companyId, assigneeAgentId },
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});
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return decision.allowed;
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}
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async function assertAgentIssueMutationAllowed(
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@ -3146,7 +3146,16 @@ export function issueRoutes(
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assertNoAgentHostWorkspaceCommandMutation(req, collectIssueWorkspaceCommandPaths(req.body));
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if (!(await assertCheapRecoveryIssueAssigneeProfileAllowed(req, res, { companyId }, req.body))) return;
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if (req.body.assigneeAgentId || req.body.assigneeUserId) {
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await assertCanAssignTasks(req, companyId);
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await assertCanAssignTasks(req, companyId, {
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projectId: await resolveAssignmentProjectId({
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companyId,
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projectId: req.body.projectId,
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parentIssueId: req.body.parentId,
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}),
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parentIssueId: req.body.parentId ?? null,
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assigneeAgentId: req.body.assigneeAgentId ?? null,
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assigneeUserId: req.body.assigneeUserId ?? null,
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});
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}
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await assertIssueEnvironmentSelection(companyId, req.body.executionWorkspaceSettings?.environmentId);
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@ -3242,7 +3251,12 @@ export function issueRoutes(
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assertNoAgentHostWorkspaceCommandMutation(req, collectIssueWorkspaceCommandPaths(req.body));
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if (!(await assertCheapRecoveryIssueAssigneeProfileAllowed(req, res, parent, req.body))) return;
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if (req.body.assigneeAgentId || req.body.assigneeUserId) {
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await assertCanAssignTasks(req, parent.companyId);
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await assertCanAssignTasks(req, parent.companyId, {
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projectId: req.body.projectId ?? parent.projectId ?? null,
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parentIssueId: parent.id,
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assigneeAgentId: req.body.assigneeAgentId ?? null,
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assigneeUserId: req.body.assigneeUserId ?? null,
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});
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}
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await assertIssueEnvironmentSelection(parent.companyId, req.body.executionWorkspaceSettings?.environmentId);
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@ -3631,7 +3645,23 @@ export function issueRoutes(
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if (assigneeWillChange && !transition.workflowControlledAssignment) {
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if (!isAgentReturningIssueToCreator) {
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await assertCanAssignTasks(req, existing.companyId);
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await assertCanAssignTasks(req, existing.companyId, {
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issueId: existing.id,
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projectId: await resolveAssignmentProjectId({
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companyId: existing.companyId,
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projectId: updateFields.projectId === undefined
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? existing.projectId
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: updateFields.projectId as string | null | undefined,
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parentIssueId: (updateFields.parentId === undefined
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? existing.parentId
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: updateFields.parentId) as string | null | undefined,
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}),
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parentIssueId: (updateFields.parentId === undefined
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? existing.parentId
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: updateFields.parentId) as string | null | undefined,
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assigneeAgentId: nextAssigneeAgentId,
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assigneeUserId: nextAssigneeUserId,
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});
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}
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}
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@ -4401,6 +4431,16 @@ export function issueRoutes(
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return;
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}
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if (issue.assigneeAgentId !== req.body.agentId) {
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await assertCanAssignTasks(req, issue.companyId, {
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issueId: issue.id,
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projectId: issue.projectId ?? null,
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parentIssueId: issue.parentId ?? null,
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assigneeAgentId: req.body.agentId,
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assigneeUserId: null,
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});
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}
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const closedExecutionWorkspace = await getClosedIssueExecutionWorkspace(issue);
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if (closedExecutionWorkspace) {
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respondClosedIssueExecutionWorkspace(res, closedExecutionWorkspace);
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