[codex] Add agent permissions and controls plan (#6386)

## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents for zero-human companies by keeping
task ownership, approvals, and operator control inside one control
plane.
> - Agent permissions and plugin-hosted company settings sit on the
boundary between autonomy and governance.
> - V1 needs scoped task assignment rules, plugin extension points, and
clearer company access surfaces without weakening company boundaries.
> - The branch builds the core authorization service, plugin SDK/host
APIs, and UI simplifications needed to support those controls.
> - Paperclip EE plugin surfaces were intentionally moved out of this
core PR per review direction, so this PR now carries only the public
core/plugin infrastructure work.
> - The latest updates preserve the PAP-9937 branch changes that belong
in this PR, remove the `design/` artifacts, and exclude the experimental
`plugin-briefs` package.
> - Greptile feedback was applied through the authorization/audit paths
and the final cleanup commit was re-reviewed at 5/5 with no unresolved
Greptile threads.
> - The benefit is safer assignment control with extension hooks for
richer permission products while preserving simple defaults for normal
operators.

## What Changed

- Added scoped task-assignment authorization decisions and routed
issue/agent assignment mutations through the authorization service.
- Added plugin SDK and host APIs for company settings slots,
authorization policy/grant management, assignment previews, and bridge
invocation scope propagation.
- Simplified core company access UI and moved advanced controls behind
plugin-provided settings surfaces.
- Added retry-now affordances for blocked issue next-step notices.
- Added protected-assignment enforcement for persisted
agent/project/issue policies, including explicit-grant fallback
behavior.
- Added incremental principal-access compatibility backfill for active
agent memberships and role-default human permission grants.
- Added the Markdown code block wrap action fix from the latest branch
changes.
- Removed `design/` artifacts from the PR and removed
`packages/plugins/plugin-briefs` from the final diff.
- Addressed Greptile feedback for plugin actor sanitization, legacy
membership handling, audit pagination, unknown grant-scope metadata, and
startup test mocks.

## Verification

- `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/access-service.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/company-portability.test.ts` -> 2 files passed, 54
tests passed.
- `pnpm exec vitest run
server/src/__tests__/server-startup-feedback-export.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/access-service.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/company-portability.test.ts` -> 3 files passed, 62
tests passed.
- `pnpm exec vitest run
server/src/__tests__/authorization-service.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/plugin-access-authorization-host-services.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/server-startup-feedback-export.test.ts` -> 3 files
passed, 28 tests passed.
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` -> passed.
- `git diff --check` -> passed.
- `node ./scripts/check-docker-deps-stage.mjs` -> passed.
- `CI=true pnpm install --frozen-lockfile --ignore-scripts` -> passed
with no lockfile update.
- `pnpm exec vitest run
ui/src/components/MarkdownBody.interaction.test.tsx` -> 1 test passed.
- `git ls-files design packages/plugins/plugin-briefs | wc -l` -> 0.
- GitHub CI on `40cd83b53` -> all checks passed, merge state `CLEAN`.
- Greptile on `40cd83b53` -> 5/5, 102 files reviewed, 0
comments/annotations added, 0 unresolved review threads.
- Confirmed the PR diff contains no `design/`,
`packages/plugins/plugin-briefs`, `pnpm-lock.yaml`, or
`.github/workflows` changes.

## Risks

- Medium: task assignment authorization paths are behaviorally stricter
for protected/private policy data, so existing plugin-authored policies
may block assignment until explicit grants or approval flows are
configured.
- Medium: plugin-host authorization APIs expand the surface area
available to trusted plugins and need careful review for company
scoping.
- Low: startup now performs a principal-access compatibility backfill,
but the migration and runtime backfill use conflict-tolerant inserts.

> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.

## Model Used

- OpenAI Codex, GPT-5 coding agent, tool-enabled workflow with shell,
git, and GitHub CLI access.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after
screenshots
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>

ui/src/lib/websocket-url.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import { browserReachableHost, buildSameOriginWebSocketUrl } from "./websocket-url";
+
+describe("browserReachableHost", () => {
+  it("keeps concrete browser hosts unchanged", () => {
+    expect(browserReachableHost({
+      protocol: "http:",
+      hostname: "paperclip-dev",
+      host: "paperclip-dev:46259",
+      port: "46259",
+    })).toBe("paperclip-dev:46259");
+  });
+
+  it("rewrites wildcard IPv4 bind hosts to localhost", () => {
+    expect(browserReachableHost({
+      protocol: "http:",
+      hostname: "0.0.0.0",
+      host: "0.0.0.0:46259",
+      port: "46259",
+    })).toBe("localhost:46259");
+  });
+
+  it("rewrites wildcard IPv6 bind hosts to localhost", () => {
+    expect(browserReachableHost({
+      protocol: "http:",
+      hostname: "::",
+      host: "[::]:46259",
+      port: "46259",
+    })).toBe("localhost:46259");
+  });
+});
+
+describe("buildSameOriginWebSocketUrl", () => {
+  it("uses wss for https pages", () => {
+    expect(buildSameOriginWebSocketUrl("/api/events/ws", {
+      protocol: "https:",
+      hostname: "example.com",
+      host: "example.com",
+      port: "",
+    })).toBe("wss://example.com/api/events/ws");
+  });
+
+  it("does not emit 0.0.0.0 websocket URLs", () => {
+    expect(buildSameOriginWebSocketUrl("api/events/ws", {
+      protocol: "http:",
+      hostname: "0.0.0.0",
+      host: "0.0.0.0:46259",
+      port: "46259",
+    })).toBe("ws://localhost:46259/api/events/ws");
+  });
+});

ui/src/lib/websocket-url.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+type BrowserLocationLike = Pick<Location, "host" | "hostname" | "port" | "protocol">;
+
+function isWildcardHost(hostname: string): boolean {
+  const normalized = hostname.trim().toLowerCase();
+  return normalized === "0.0.0.0" || normalized === "::" || normalized === "[::]";
+}
+
+export function browserReachableHost(location: BrowserLocationLike = window.location): string {
+  if (!isWildcardHost(location.hostname)) return location.host;
+  return location.port ? `localhost:${location.port}` : "localhost";
+}
+
+export function buildSameOriginWebSocketUrl(
+  path: string,
+  location: BrowserLocationLike = window.location,
+): string {
+  const protocol = location.protocol === "https:" ? "wss" : "ws";
+  const normalizedPath = path.startsWith("/") ? path : `/${path}`;
+  return `${protocol}://${browserReachableHost(location)}${normalizedPath}`;
+}