Add secrets provider vaults and remote import (#5429)

## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip orchestrates AI-agent companies and needs secrets handling
to work across local development, hosted operators, and governed agent
execution.
> - The affected subsystem is the company-scoped secrets control plane:
database schema, server services/routes, CLI workflows, and the Secrets
settings UI.
> - The gap was that secrets were local-only and operators could not
manage provider vaults or import existing remote references without
exposing plaintext.
> - This branch adds provider vault configuration plus an AWS Secrets
Manager remote-import path while preserving company boundaries, binding
context, and audit trails.
> - I kept the PR to a single branch PR, removed unrelated
lockfile/package drift, rebased the full branch onto the current
`public-gh/master`, and addressed fresh Greptile findings.
> - The benefit is a reviewable implementation of provider-backed
secrets with focused tests covering provider selection, import
conflicts, deleted secret reuse, rotation guards, and AWS signing
behavior.

## What Changed

- Added provider vault support for company secrets, including provider
config storage, default vault handling, health checks, binding usage,
access events, and remote import preview/commit.
- Added an AWS Secrets Manager provider using SigV4 request signing,
bounded request timeouts, namespace guardrails, cached runtime
credential resolution, and external-reference linking without plaintext
reads.
- Added Secrets UI surfaces for vault management and remote import, plus
CLI/API documentation for setup and operations.
- Stabilized routine webhook secret binding paths and SSH
environment-driver fixture bindings discovered during verification.
- Addressed Greptile and CI findings: no lockfile/package drift,
monotonic migration metadata, disabled-vault default races, soft-deleted
secret hiding/recreate behavior, remove behavior with disabled vaults,
soft-deleted external-reference re-import, non-active rotation guards,
managed-secret soft deletion through PATCH, and per-call AWS SDK
credential client churn.
- Rebased this branch onto `public-gh/master` at `0e1a5828` and
force-pushed with lease to keep this as the single PR for the branch.

## Verification

- `git fetch public-gh master`
- `git rebase public-gh/master`
- `git diff --name-only public-gh/master...HEAD | grep
'^pnpm-lock\.yaml$' || true` confirmed `pnpm-lock.yaml` is not in the PR
diff.
- Confirmed migration ordering: master ends at `0081_optimal_dormammu`;
this PR adds `0082_dry_vision` and
`0083_company_secret_provider_configs`.
- Inspected migrations for repeat safety: new tables/indexes use `IF NOT
EXISTS`; foreign keys are guarded by `DO $$ ... IF NOT EXISTS`; column
additions use `ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS`.
- `pnpm -r typecheck` passed before the Greptile follow-up commits.
- `pnpm test:run` ran the full stable Vitest path before the Greptile
follow-up commits; it completed with 3 timing-related failures under
parallel load: `codex-local-execute.test.ts`,
`cursor-local-execute.test.ts`, and `environment-service.test.ts`.
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run
src/__tests__/codex-local-execute.test.ts
src/__tests__/cursor-local-execute.test.ts
src/__tests__/environment-service.test.ts` passed on targeted rerun
(`24/24`).
- `pnpm build` passed before the Greptile follow-up commits. Vite
reported existing chunk-size/dynamic-import warnings.
- After Greptile follow-up commits: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server
exec vitest run src/__tests__/secrets-service.test.ts` passed (`26/26`).
- After Greptile follow-up commits: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server
exec vitest run src/__tests__/aws-secrets-manager-provider.test.ts
src/__tests__/secrets-service.test.ts` passed (`39/39`).
- After Greptile follow-up commits: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server
typecheck` passed.
- Captured Storybook screenshots from `ui/storybook-static` for visual
review.
- Latest PR checks on `5ca3a5cf`: `policy`, serialized server suites
1/4-4/4, `Canary Dry Run`, `e2e`, `security/snyk`, and `Greptile Review`
pass; aggregate `verify` is still registering the completed child
checks.
- Greptile review loop continued through the latest requested pass; all
Greptile review threads are resolved and the latest `Greptile Review`
check on `5ca3a5cf` passed with 0 comments added.

## Screenshots

Before: the provider-vault and remote-import surfaces did not exist on
`master`; these are after-state screenshots from the Storybook fixtures.

![Secrets
inventory](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/paperclipai/paperclip/PAP-2339-secrets-make-a-plan/doc/pr/5429/secrets-inventory.png)

![Secret binding
picker](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/paperclipai/paperclip/PAP-2339-secrets-make-a-plan/doc/pr/5429/secret-binding-picker.png)

![Environment editor with
secrets](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/paperclipai/paperclip/PAP-2339-secrets-make-a-plan/doc/pr/5429/env-editor-with-secrets.png)

## Risks

- Migration risk: this adds new secret provider tables and extends
existing secret rows. The migrations were checked for monotonic ordering
and idempotent guards, but reviewers should still inspect upgrade
behavior carefully.
- Provider risk: AWS support uses direct SigV4 requests. Automated tests
cover signing, request timeouts, vault-config selection, namespace
guardrails, pending-version archival, sanitized provider errors, and
service-level cleanup paths. A real-vault AWS smoke test remains
deployment validation for an operator with AWS credentials rather than
an unverified merge blocker in this local branch.
- UI risk: the Secrets page and import dialog are large new surfaces;
screenshots are included above for reviewer inspection.
- Verification risk: the full local stable test command hit
parallel-load timing failures, although the exact failed files passed
when rerun directly.
- Operational risk: remote import intentionally avoids plaintext reads;
operators must understand that imported external references resolve at
runtime and may fail if AWS permissions change.

> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.

## Model Used

- OpenAI Codex, GPT-5 coding agent with local shell/tool use in the
Paperclip worktree. Exact context-window size was not exposed by the
runtime.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [ ] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after
screenshots
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

doc/plans/2026-04-26-plugin-secret-ref-company-scope.md

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+# Plugin Secret Refs: Company Scope Reintroduction Plan
+
+Date: 2026-04-26
+Status: follow-up after fail-closed mitigation
+Related issue: PAP-2394
+
+## Current state
+
+`PAP-2394` now fails closed:
+
+- `POST /api/plugins/:pluginId/config` rejects any config containing plugin secret refs.
+- `ctx.secrets.resolve()` is disabled for plugin workers.
+
+This removes the release-blocking cross-company exposure path, but it also disables plugin secret-ref support until the runtime carries company scope end to end.
+
+## Vulnerability summary
+
+The original design mixed an instance-global config store with company-scoped secret bindings:
+
+- [server/src/routes/plugins.ts](/Users/dotta/paperclip/.paperclip/worktrees/PAP-2339-secrets-make-a-plan/server/src/routes/plugins.ts:1898) saved one global plugin config row, then wrote bindings into `company_secret_bindings` grouped by each referenced secret's owning company.
+- [packages/db/src/schema/plugin_config.ts](/Users/dotta/paperclip/.paperclip/worktrees/PAP-2339-secrets-make-a-plan/packages/db/src/schema/plugin_config.ts:15) stored one config row per plugin, with no company dimension.
+- [packages/db/src/schema/company_secret_bindings.ts](/Users/dotta/paperclip/.paperclip/worktrees/PAP-2339-secrets-make-a-plan/packages/db/src/schema/company_secret_bindings.ts:5) already modeled bindings as company-scoped.
+- [server/src/services/plugin-secrets-handler.ts](/Users/dotta/paperclip/.paperclip/worktrees/PAP-2339-secrets-make-a-plan/server/src/services/plugin-secrets-handler.ts:212) resolved by `pluginId` + secret UUID, with no active company context from the bridge call.
+- [packages/plugins/sdk/src/worker-rpc-host.ts](/Users/dotta/paperclip/.paperclip/worktrees/PAP-2339-secrets-make-a-plan/packages/plugins/sdk/src/worker-rpc-host.ts:384) exposed `ctx.config.get()` and `ctx.secrets.resolve()` without a company parameter.
+
+This violated Least Privilege, Complete Mediation, and Secure Defaults.
+
+## Recommended end state
+
+Re-enable plugin secret refs only after both of these are true:
+
+1. Plugin config reads/writes are company-scoped.
+2. Runtime secret resolution carries explicit company context and enforces it at resolution time.
+
+## Implementation plan
+
+### 1. Make plugin config company-scoped
+
+- Add `company_id` to `plugin_config`, with a unique index on `(plugin_id, company_id)`.
+- Update registry helpers to require `companyId` for `getConfig`, `upsertConfig`, `patchConfig`, and `deleteConfig`.
+- Update plugin config routes to require `companyId` and call `assertCompanyAccess(req, companyId)`.
+- Keep instance-global plugin lifecycle state separate from company-scoped plugin config.
+
+### 2. Propagate company context through the worker runtime
+
+- Extend the SDK so `ctx.config.get()` and `ctx.secrets.resolve()` can receive or derive `companyId`.
+- Introduce worker request context storage for handlers that already run with company scope:
+  - `getData`
+  - `performAction`
+  - scoped API routes
+  - tool executions
+  - environment driver calls
+- Fail closed when plugin code tries to read company-scoped config or secrets outside an active company context.
+
+### 3. Rebind secrets by `(companyId, pluginId, configPath)`
+
+- On config save, validate every referenced secret belongs to the authorized company.
+- Store bindings only for that company.
+- Resolve secrets only by the current company-scoped binding, never by bare plugin ID plus UUID.
+- Treat stale bindings as invalid and remove them on config replacement.
+
+### 4. Prevent cross-company config disclosure
+
+- When returning config to the UI, only materialize the selected company's secret refs.
+- Never expose another company's secret UUIDs through the global plugin config surface.
+
+## Required regression coverage
+
+- Company A board user cannot save plugin config that references a Company B secret.
+- Company A plugin execution cannot resolve a Company B secret even if the same plugin is configured for Company B.
+- Company-scoped config reads only return the selected company's secret bindings.
+- Config replacement removes stale bindings for the same `(companyId, pluginId)` target.
+- Runtime calls without company context fail closed.
+
+## Migration notes
+
+- Existing `plugin_config` rows need a migration strategy before re-enable.
+- Safest default: do not auto-assume a company for historical secret refs.
+- Prefer one of:
+  - explicit admin migration per company, or
+  - import existing rows as non-secret config only and require re-entry of secret refs.
+
+## Release posture
+
+- Keep plugin secret refs disabled until all steps above land.
+- Do not restore the feature behind a soft warning; the insecure path must remain unavailable by default.