## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents and company-scoped control-plane
actions for zero-human companies.
> - This change touches the server authz boundary around company
portability, approvals, activity, and heartbeat-run operations.
> - The vulnerability was that board-authenticated callers could cross
company boundaries or create new companies through import paths without
the same authorization checks enforced elsewhere.
> - Once that gap existed, an attacker could chain it into higher-impact
behavior through agent execution paths.
> - The fix needed to harden every confirmed authorization gap in the
reported chain, not just the first route that exposed it.
> - This pull request adds the missing instance-admin and company-access
checks and adds regression tests for each affected route.
> - The benefit is that cross-company actions and new-company import
flows now follow the same control-plane authorization rules as the rest
of the product.
## What Changed
- Required instance-admin access for `new_company` import preview/apply
flows in `server/src/routes/companies.ts`.
- Required company access before approval decision routes in
`server/src/routes/approvals.ts`.
- Required company access for activity creation and heartbeat-run issue
listing in `server/src/routes/activity.ts`.
- Required company access before heartbeat cancellation in
`server/src/routes/agents.ts`.
- Added regression coverage in the corresponding server route tests.
## Verification
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run
src/__tests__/company-portability-routes.test.ts
src/__tests__/approval-routes-idempotency.test.ts
src/__tests__/activity-routes.test.ts
src/__tests__/agent-permissions-routes.test.ts`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck`
- Prior verification on the original security patch branch also included
`pnpm build`.
## Risks
- Low code risk: the change is narrow and only adds missing
authorization gates to existing routes.
- Operational risk: the advisory is already public, so this PR should be
merged quickly to minimize the public unpatched window.
- Residual product risk remains around open signup / bootstrap defaults,
which was intentionally left out of this patch because the current
first-user onboarding flow depends on it.
## Model Used
- OpenAI GPT-5 Codex coding agent with tool use and local code execution
in the Codex CLI environment.
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [ ] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after
screenshots
- [ ] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
Co-authored-by: Forgotten <forgottenrunes@protonmail.com>
On resumed sessions, skipping --append-system-prompt-file (the original
fix) left two secondary issues:
- commandNotes still claimed the flag was injected, producing misleading
onMeta logs on every resumed heartbeat
- The instructions file was still read from disk and a combined temp file
written on every resume, even though effectiveInstructionsFilePath was
never consumed
Hoist canResumeSession before the I/O block and gate both the disk
operations and commandNotes construction on !canResumeSession / !sessionId.
Adds three regression tests: commandNotes is populated on fresh sessions,
empty on resume; and no agent-instructions.md is written on resume.
On resumed sessions the agent instructions are already present in the
session cache. Unconditionally passing --append-system-prompt-file
re-injects 5-10K redundant tokens per heartbeat and may be rejected by
the Claude CLI when combined with --resume.
Guard the flag behind `!resumeSessionId` so it is only appended on
fresh session starts.
Fixes: #2848
