paperclip/.github/scripts/check-pr-security.mjs
brandonburr 96feaa331a
feat(commitperclip): add automated PR quality and security gates (#6469)
Fixes #6470

## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is an open-source AI agent platform receiving a high
volume of community PRs — currently 2,398 open
> - The contributor experience is broken: PRs sit for months with no
feedback, contributors don't know why they're stuck, and maintainers
spend review time on PRs that are missing basics
> - Common problems: no linked issue, no test coverage, incomplete PR
template, manually-edited lockfile — all catchable before human review
> - At the same time, accepting untrusted PRs from unknown contributors
is a real attack surface: malicious packages, secret injection,
tampering with CI scripts, and code touching the sensitive paths from
the April security advisories
> - This PR adds automated gates that run on every PR: quality failures
get a clear comment telling contributors exactly what to fix, security
concerns are silently flagged as draft advisories and block merge via a
pending check run
> - The benefit is a dramatically faster feedback loop for good-faith
contributors and a meaningful security layer for the maintainers
reviewing them

## What Changed

- **`.github/workflows/commitperclip-review.yml`** — new workflow using
`pull_request_target` (runs in base branch context, has secrets, never
executes PR code). Runs quality gates + security gates on every PR
open/update.
- **`.github/dependabot.yml`** — weekly automated dependency
vulnerability PRs for npm and GitHub Actions.
- **`.github/scripts/get-bot-token.mjs`** — generates a short-lived
commitperclip installation token from `COMMITPERCLIP_KEY` secret.
- **`.github/scripts/run-quality-gates.mjs`** — orchestrates 5 quality
gates, posts/updates a single consolidated comment on the PR.
- **`.github/scripts/check-pr-template.mjs`** — validates all 5 required
template sections, Thinking Path depth (≥3 sentences), Model Used not
placeholder.
- **`.github/scripts/check-pr-linked-issue.mjs`** — requires `Fixes
#NNN` or issue URL in PR body.
- **`.github/scripts/check-pr-test-coverage.mjs`** — requires at least
one test file in the diff.
- **`.github/scripts/check-pr-lockfile.mjs`** — blocks manual
`pnpm-lock.yaml` edits (only the refresh bot may change it).
- **`.github/scripts/check-pr-dependencies.mjs`** — informational
comment when new npm packages are added.
- **`.github/scripts/check-pr-security.mjs`** — 6 silent security
checks: secret patterns, CI workflow tampering, build script changes,
supply chain (new packages in lockfile), suspicious test patterns
(outbound network/shell exec/env var reads), and changes to the 9
sensitive path prefixes from the April advisories. When any fire:
creates a draft security advisory + sets `security-review` check to
`in_progress` (blocks merge). When clean: sets `security-review` to
`success`.
- **`actions/dependency-review-action@v4`** — per-PR dependency
vulnerability check (fails if new dep has known CVE).
- **44 unit tests** across all gate modules (`node:test`, no external
deps).

## Verification

Run all unit tests locally:
```bash
node --test .github/scripts/tests/*.test.mjs
```
Expected: 44 pass, 0 fail.

End-to-end: open a PR missing the template, linked issue, and test files
→ commitperclip posts a consolidated comment listing all failures. Open
a PR with all gates satisfied → ` All checks passing` comment posted,
all check runs green.

## Risks

**`pull_request_target` security model:** This workflow runs in base
branch context and has access to secrets. It explicitly checks out `ref:
master` (never PR code) and reads the PR diff via GitHub API only — no
PR code is ever executed. This is the correct pattern for running
secret-bearing checks on fork PRs; deviating from it (e.g. checking out
the PR branch) would be a security vulnerability.

**False positives on security gates:** The sensitive-path gate flags any
PR touching the 9 path prefixes from the April advisories. Legitimate
fixes to those paths will trigger draft advisories. This is intentional
— those paths warrant a human look regardless. The `security-review`
check can be manually resolved by a maintainer once reviewed.

**commitperclip not yet installed:** Until the app is installed on this
repo and the `COMMITPERCLIP_KEY` secret is added, the workflow will fail
on the token generation step. The quality gate comment won't post, but
Dependency Review will still run independently.

## Model Used

Claude Sonnet 4.5, 200k context window, extended thinking enabled, tool
use: read/edit files, bash execution, GitHub API calls

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass (44/44)
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable (44 unit tests
across all gate modules)
- [ ] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after
screenshots (N/A — CI only)
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---

## One-time setup needed from you, Dotta

1. **Install commitperclip app** on this repo:
https://github.com/apps/commitperclip/installations/new
2. **Add `COMMITPERCLIP_KEY`** as a repository secret (Actions →
Secrets) — ask @brandonburr for the key
3. **Add `security_advisories: write` and `checks: write`** to the
commitperclip app permissions (commit-capital org → Settings → Apps →
commitperclip → Permissions)
4. **Install Socket.dev** from GitHub Marketplace for supply chain
scanning
5. **Branch protection** (optional but recommended): require
`commitperclip-review` and `security-review` checks to pass before merge

## Dashboard integration note

The `commitperclip-review` check run result maps cleanly to your PR
triage dashboard. A single filter on your Worker:

```javascript
const gatesCheck = checkRuns.find(r => r.name === 'commitperclip-review');
if (gatesCheck?.conclusion === 'failure') return null; // filter from queue
```

For security flags: `GET
/repos/paperclipai/paperclip/security-advisories?state=draft` — advisory
titles include `PR #NNN` for cross-referencing. PRs with a matching
draft advisory have `security-review` in `in_progress` state (grey
spinner, can't merge via branch protection).

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Devin Foley <devin@devinfoley.com>
Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-06-01 09:52:53 -07:00

350 lines
13 KiB
JavaScript

#!/usr/bin/env node
/**
* check-pr-security.mjs
* Runs 6 security checks against a PR diff. Never posts public comments.
* Creates a draft security advisory in the repo if any check fires.
*
* Env: GH_TOKEN, GH_REPO, PR_NUMBER, PR_AUTHOR
* Exit: always 0 — security flags are silent, never block the PR visibly.
*/
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
import { ghFetch } from './get-bot-token.mjs';
import { fetchAllPullRequestFiles } from './fetch-pr-files.mjs';
import { resolveBaseRef } from './check-pr-dependencies.mjs';
// ── Pure check functions (exported for testing) ───────────────────────────────
const SECRET_PATTERNS = [
{ name: 'OpenAI API key', re: /sk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{32,}/ },
{ name: 'Google API key', re: /AIza[0-9A-Za-z\-_]{35}/ },
{ name: 'AWS access key', re: /AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}/ },
{ name: 'Private key', re: /-----BEGIN (RSA|EC|OPENSSH) PRIVATE KEY-----/ },
{ name: 'High-entropy secret', re: /[a-zA-Z_]*(key|token|secret|password|credential)[a-zA-Z_]*\s*[=:]\s*["'][^"']{20,}["']/i },
];
export function scanSecrets(files) {
const flags = [];
for (const file of files) {
if (!file.patch) continue;
const added = file.patch.split('\n').filter(l => l.startsWith('+') && !l.startsWith('+++'));
for (const line of added) {
for (const { name, re } of SECRET_PATTERNS) {
if (re.test(line)) {
flags.push({ check: 'secret-scan', file: file.filename, pattern: name, line: line.slice(0, 120) });
}
}
}
}
return flags;
}
const CI_BUILD_SCRIPTS = [
'scripts/release.sh',
'scripts/check-docker-deps-stage.mjs',
'scripts/check-release-package-bootstrap.mjs',
'scripts/release-package-map.mjs',
'scripts/docker-onboard-smoke.sh',
];
export function scanCITampering(files) {
return files
.filter(f => f.filename.startsWith('.github/workflows/') && f.status !== 'removed')
.map(f => ({ check: 'ci-tampering', file: f.filename }));
}
export function scanBuildScripts(files) {
return files
.filter(f => CI_BUILD_SCRIPTS.includes(f.filename) && f.status !== 'removed')
.map(f => ({ check: 'build-script-change', file: f.filename }));
}
export function scanSupplyChain(files) {
const lockfile = files.find(f => f.filename === 'pnpm-lock.yaml');
if (!lockfile?.patch) return [];
const added = new Set();
const removed = new Set();
for (const line of lockfile.patch.split('\n')) {
const entry = parseLockfilePackageDiffEntry(line);
if (!entry) continue;
if (entry.sign === '+') added.add(entry.packageName);
if (entry.sign === '-') removed.add(entry.packageName);
}
const netNew = [...added].filter(p => !removed.has(p));
return netNew.length ? [{ check: 'supply-chain', packages: netNew }] : [];
}
function parseLockfilePackageDiffEntry(line) {
const match = line.match(/^([+-])\s*(.+?)\s*$/);
if (!match) return null;
let [, sign, rawEntry] = match;
if (!rawEntry.endsWith(':')) return null;
rawEntry = rawEntry.slice(0, -1).trim();
if ((rawEntry.startsWith("'") && rawEntry.endsWith("'")) || (rawEntry.startsWith('"') && rawEntry.endsWith('"'))) {
rawEntry = rawEntry.slice(1, -1);
}
rawEntry = rawEntry.replace(/\(.*$/, '').trim();
const versionSep = rawEntry.lastIndexOf('@');
if (versionSep <= 0 || versionSep === rawEntry.length - 1) return null;
const packageName = rawEntry.slice(0, versionSep);
if (!/^(?:@[^/\s:]+\/)?[A-Za-z0-9._-][A-Za-z0-9._/-]*$/.test(packageName)) return null;
return { sign, packageName };
}
const TEST_FILE_RE = /\.(test|spec)\.(ts|js|tsx|jsx)$|\/(?:__tests__|tests?)\//;
const SUSPICIOUS_PATTERNS = [
{ name: 'outbound-network', re: /\+.*(fetch\(|axios\.|http\.request|https\.request)/ },
{ name: 'env-var-read', re: /\+.*process\.env\.(?!(?:NODE_ENV|CI|TEST|VITEST|npm_))([A-Z_]{4,})/ },
{ name: 'shell-exec', re: /\+.*(execSync\(|spawnSync\(|exec\(|spawn\()/ },
{ name: 'absolute-file-read', re: /\+.*(readFile|readFileSync)\s*\(\s*["'`]?\// },
];
export function scanTestPatterns(files) {
const flags = [];
for (const file of files) {
if (!TEST_FILE_RE.test(file.filename) || !file.patch) continue;
for (const { name, re } of SUSPICIOUS_PATTERNS) {
if (re.test(file.patch)) {
flags.push({ check: 'suspicious-test', file: file.filename, pattern: name });
}
}
}
return flags;
}
const SENSITIVE_PATHS = [
// Advisory 1: codex-local adapter (inherited ChatGPT/Gmail OAuth scopes)
'packages/adapters/codex-local/',
// Advisory 2 & 11: OS command injection / privilege escalation via provisionCommand / cleanupCommand
'server/src/services/workspace-realization.ts',
'server/src/routes/execution-workspaces.ts',
'server/src/routes/workspace-command-authz.ts',
// Advisory 3 & 6: Cross-tenant agent API key minting and IDOR on /agents/:id/keys
'server/src/routes/agents.ts',
// Advisory 4: Approval decision attribution spoofing via decidedByUserId
'server/src/routes/approvals.ts',
// Advisory 5: Stored XSS via javascript: URLs in MarkdownBody (urlTransform)
'ui/src/components/MarkdownBody.tsx',
// Advisory 7: Unauthenticated access to authenticated-mode endpoints
'server/src/routes/authz.ts',
// Advisory 8: Unauthenticated RCE via import authorization bypass
'server/src/routes/companies.ts',
// Advisory 9: Malicious skills able to exfiltrate / destroy user data
'server/src/routes/company-skills.ts',
// Advisory 10: Arbitrary file read via agent-controlled instructionsFilePath
'server/src/services/agent-instructions.ts',
];
export function scanSensitivePaths(files) {
return files
.filter(f => f.status !== 'removed' && SENSITIVE_PATHS.some(p => f.filename.startsWith(p)))
.map(f => ({
check: 'sensitive-path',
file: f.filename,
advisoryPath: SENSITIVE_PATHS.find(p => f.filename.startsWith(p)),
}));
}
function buildContentsPath(repo, filename, ref) {
return `/repos/${repo}/contents/${filename}?${new URLSearchParams({ ref }).toString()}`;
}
export async function validateSensitivePaths(token, repo, prNumber, baseRef, fetchFromGitHub = ghFetch) {
const resolvedBaseRef = await resolveBaseRef(fetchFromGitHub, token, repo, prNumber, baseRef);
const stale = [];
await Promise.all(SENSITIVE_PATHS.map(async (path) => {
try {
await fetchFromGitHub(buildContentsPath(repo, path, resolvedBaseRef), token);
} catch (err) {
// 404 means the file/directory no longer exists at this path
if (String(err.message).includes('404')) stale.push(path);
// Other errors (network, rate limit) — re-throw so we don't silently miss them
else throw err;
}
}));
return stale;
}
// ── Advisory creation ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
const SEVERITY_MAP = {
'supply-chain': 'critical',
'sensitive-path': 'critical',
'secret-scan': 'high',
'ci-tampering': 'high',
'suspicious-test': 'high',
'build-script-change': 'medium',
};
const SEVERITY_ORDER = ['low', 'medium', 'high', 'critical'];
function worstSeverity(flags) {
return flags.reduce((worst, f) => {
const s = SEVERITY_MAP[f.check] ?? 'medium';
return SEVERITY_ORDER.indexOf(s) > SEVERITY_ORDER.indexOf(worst) ? s : worst;
}, 'low');
}
export function buildAdvisoryPayload(prNumber, prTitle, flags) {
const checkNames = [...new Set(flags.map(f => f.check))].join(', ');
return {
summary: `🚨 Security flag — PR #${prNumber}: ${checkNames}`,
description: [
`**PR:** #${prNumber}${prTitle}`,
`**Checks triggered:** ${checkNames}`,
'',
'**Details:**',
...flags.map(f => [
`- \`${f.check}\`: ${f.file ?? ''}`,
f.pattern ? ` (pattern: ${f.pattern})` : '',
f.packages ? ` (packages: ${f.packages.join(', ')})` : '',
f.line ? `\n \`${f.line}\`` : '',
].join('')),
'',
'> This advisory was created automatically by commitperclip. Review and dismiss if not a real concern.',
].join('\n'),
severity: worstSeverity(flags),
vulnerabilities: [],
};
}
export async function syncDraftAdvisory(fetchImpl, token, repo, prNumber, prTitle, flags) {
const existing = await findExistingDraftAdvisory(fetchImpl, token, repo, prNumber);
const payload = buildAdvisoryPayload(prNumber, prTitle, flags);
if (existing) {
const advisoryId = existing.ghsa_id ?? existing.id;
if (!advisoryId) {
throw new Error(`Existing advisory for PR #${prNumber} is missing both ghsa_id and id.`);
}
return fetchImpl(`/repos/${repo}/security-advisories/${advisoryId}`, token, {
method: 'PATCH',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify(payload),
});
}
return fetchImpl(`/repos/${repo}/security-advisories`, token, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify(payload),
});
}
export async function findExistingDraftAdvisory(fetchImpl, token, repo, prNumber) {
const prMarker = `PR #${prNumber}`;
for (let page = 1; ; page += 1) {
const advisories = await fetchImpl(
`/repos/${repo}/security-advisories?state=draft&per_page=100&page=${page}`,
token,
);
if (!Array.isArray(advisories) || advisories.length === 0) return null;
const existing = advisories.find(advisory =>
typeof advisory?.summary === 'string' && advisory.summary.includes(prMarker)
);
if (existing) return existing;
if (advisories.length < 100) return null;
}
}
export async function postSecurityCheckRun(fetchImpl, token, repo, headSha, hasFlags) {
await fetchImpl(`/repos/${repo}/check-runs`, token, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify(hasFlags ? {
name: 'security-review',
head_sha: headSha,
status: 'in_progress',
output: {
title: 'Security Review Pending',
summary: 'This PR has been flagged for manual security review by a maintainer. No action needed from you.',
},
} : {
name: 'security-review',
head_sha: headSha,
status: 'completed',
conclusion: 'success',
output: {
title: 'Security Review Passed',
summary: 'No security concerns detected.',
},
}),
});
}
// ── Main ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
async function main() {
const { GH_TOKEN, GH_REPO, PR_NUMBER } = process.env;
if (!GH_TOKEN || !GH_REPO || !PR_NUMBER) {
console.error('ERROR: GH_TOKEN, GH_REPO, PR_NUMBER required');
process.exit(1);
}
// Sanitize inputs before use in URL construction (prevents SSRF)
const prNumber = parseInt(PR_NUMBER, 10);
if (!Number.isInteger(prNumber) || prNumber <= 0) {
console.error('ERROR: PR_NUMBER must be a positive integer');
process.exit(1);
}
if (!/^[a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+\/[a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+$/.test(GH_REPO)) {
console.error('ERROR: GH_REPO must be in owner/repo format');
process.exit(1);
}
// Validate SENSITIVE_PATHS — fails loudly if any have been refactored away on the PR base branch
const stalePaths = await validateSensitivePaths(GH_TOKEN, GH_REPO, prNumber);
if (stalePaths.length > 0) {
console.error('ERROR: Stale sensitive paths in check-pr-security.mjs:');
for (const p of stalePaths) console.error(` - ${p}`);
console.error('');
console.error('These paths no longer exist on the PR base branch. The security gate will silently produce no signal for them.');
console.error('Update SENSITIVE_PATHS in check-pr-security.mjs to reflect the current code structure.');
process.exit(1);
}
const [pr, files] = await Promise.all([
ghFetch(`/repos/${GH_REPO}/pulls/${prNumber}`, GH_TOKEN),
fetchAllPullRequestFiles(ghFetch, GH_REPO, prNumber, GH_TOKEN),
]);
const allFlags = [
...scanSecrets(files),
...scanCITampering(files),
...scanBuildScripts(files),
...scanSupplyChain(files),
...scanTestPatterns(files),
...scanSensitivePaths(files),
];
if (allFlags.length > 0) {
console.error(`[security] ${allFlags.length} flag(s) detected — creating draft advisory and pending check run`);
await Promise.all([
syncDraftAdvisory(ghFetch, GH_TOKEN, GH_REPO, prNumber, pr.title, allFlags),
postSecurityCheckRun(ghFetch, GH_TOKEN, GH_REPO, pr.head.sha, true),
]);
} else {
console.log('[security] all clear');
await postSecurityCheckRun(ghFetch, GH_TOKEN, GH_REPO, pr.head.sha, false);
}
// Always exit 0 — security flags are silent, never block the PR publicly
process.exit(0);
}
if (process.argv[1] === fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)) {
main().catch(e => { console.error(e.message); process.exit(1); });
}